The manifesto for literal translations does not call for all translations to be done this way. Its goal is to fill the vacant niche between the numerous artistic adaptations and complex grammatical analyses. A literal translation acts as a necessary "bridge," allowing one to see the original structure of the text and the logic of the Dhamma directly, with little to no immersion in linguistics. It is the missing link for those who seek greater precision and independence in studying the original sources but have not yet learned Pali to the required level.
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Issues with Contextual Translation
Contextual translation was an appropriate path of least resistance for primary text translations when there were no English translations at all or in the process of creating translations directly from Pali to English, but as a result, a number of problems arose, including fundamental ones.
A case in point:
In an imaginary text - word X is translated as "flying fox", in another word X is translated as "polo mallet". Contextual translation led to the word "bat" losing both its meanings, or acquiring additional unnecessary connotations.
Example 1 from translations:
anicc-ucchādana-parimaddana-bhedanaviddhaṁsanadhammassa
...body... subject to impermanence, deformation and abrasion, disintegration and dispersion.
And the second case:
ucchādana-parimaddana-nhāpanasambāhanaṁ
"But he agrees to have them rub, massage, bathe, knead him."
ucchādana (translated as deformation and rubbing) as in the example with the word "bow" the word covering (as smearing, covering, including as concealment for the case with unreliability and disintegration) acquired an inappropriate meaning, although it could have been verified and clarified.
parimaddana (abrasion, massage) - instead of a general word, for example, kneading (when something is crumpled).
Example 2 fundamental problem
dukkha - translated sometimes as pain, sometimes as suffering*, led to the cause (pain) becoming less important, and the consequence (suffering) becoming the main goal of Liberation.
The fact that the definition of dukkha exists in the Suttas is ignored everywhere, not only in English translations.
dn22 - definitions of the concept in the practical realization of the four noble truths, mn141 - definition of the concept in the four noble truths.
Katamañcāvuso, dukkhaṁ?
Yaṁ kho, āvuso, kāyikaṁ dukkhaṁ kāyikaṁ asātaṁ kāyasamphassajaṁ dukkhaṁ asātaṁ vedayitaṁ,
idaṁ vuccatāvuso: 'dukkhaṁ'.
And what, friends, is pain?
That which, friends, is bodily pain, bodily discomfort, born of bodily contact, pain, discomfort felt,
This is called, friends, "pain".
Katamañcāvuso, domanassaṁ?
Yaṁ kho, āvuso, cetasikaṁ dukkhaṁ cetasikaṁ asātaṁ manosamphassajaṁ dukkhaṁ asātaṁ vedayitaṁ,
idaṁ vuccatāvuso: 'domanassaṁ'.
And what, friends, is "suffering" (discontent, dissatisfaction)?
That which, friends, is mental pain, mental discomfort, born of mental contact, pain, discomfort felt,
This is called, friends, "suffering".
There is no definition of dukkha (pain) as "suffering" in the Suttas or Vinaya, on the contrary "suffering" (domanassa) is defined through the concept of "mental" pain (dukkha).
But in the case of bodily pain-discomfort, contextual translation wasn't even needed. Since the word "pain" already has a meaning and even more suitable than "suffering". In a figurative sense, "pain" is a problem, something that requires a solution, without the hyperbolic "loudness" of the word "suffering". Example: This issue is my long-standing pain. Thus, the word "pain" covers all necessary contexts and preserves the priority of bodily sensation over the reaction to this sensation or experience (more on this below).
There are also fundamental problems arising from ignoring context. As in the case of the word anta - end, edge, boundary, threshold, limit, which is erroneously translated and continues to be translated as "extreme", even contrary to the context of the place in the text where it is so translated, not to mention other occurrences of this word where such meaning is completely inapplicable.
Tatra kho bhagavā pañcavaggiye bhikkhū āmantesi:
Here the Blessed One addressed the group of five monks:
"Dveme, bhikkhave, antā pabbajitena na sevitabbā.
"Two ends, monks, should not be approached by one gone forth.
...
Ete kho, bhikkhave, ubho ante anupagamma majjhimā paṭipadā tathāgatena abhisambuddhā cakkhukaraṇī ñāṇakaraṇī upasamāya abhiññāya sambodhāya nibbānāya saṁvattati.
Not approaching, monks, these two ends, the Middle Practice realized by the Tathagata gives vision, gives knowledge, leads to peace, to direct knowledge, to awakening, to nibbana.
sn56.11
Certainly a phenomenon can have an intensity scale from minimum (end, boundary, edge, threshold) to maximum (edge, limit, extreme). And the word "end" - can be in the meaning of both "threshold" and "limit", but the word "extreme" hardly refers to the beginning, and moreover, it is not even interpreted that way.
In this context the Buddha says that the Middle Practice "does not approach", "does not come near" anupagamma both edges. If it were said about extremes - this would assume that a certain range of involvement is allowed — until excessiveness is reached.
The Buddha's Teaching points to not approaching even the threshold, to complete non-involvement, neither in desires, nor in self-mortification, even in their minimal forms.
As a result of this distortion, the Teaching leading to maximum clarity and uncompromisingness — the Middle (in the sense of center, balance beyond extreme points) — acquired properties of "mediocrity" (averageness): the idea of compromise where "a little indulgence in desires" or "a little self-restriction" is allowed, just not "too much". The Middle Practice is not "moderation in passions and self-mortification", it is non-entry into either system of attachment. Therefore, such cases represent categorical distortions, not just translation inaccuracies.
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Cross-Verifiability of Consistent Terminology
In addition to consistent terminology in the Buddha's Teaching, cross-verifiability and unidirectionality are easily traceable, preserving many principles including that the Tathagata's speech cannot be ambiguously contradictory dvayagāmini, and on the contrary, that the Dhamma should be well-formulated svākkhāto.
Example: dukkha is defined in mn141, dn22 and other suttas as bodily pain, bodily discomfort. There is no definition of dukkha as "suffering" in the Suttas or Vinaya - this is the result of contextual translation.
In the 4 noble truths:
soka-parideva-dukkha-domanass-upāyāsa
dukkha domanassa - two direct definitions: bodily and mental pain and discomfort respectively. bodily comes before mental.
In satipatthanas:
kāyo vedana - the first two parts of satipatthana, citta - mind-state third
In 6 dhatus (4 great elements + 2 dhatus):
4 great elements are all "bodily" (mn28) viññāṇadhatu ~mental or more precisely phenomenon producing mentality.
In 5 aggregates of clinging:
rūpa vedana sañña saṅkhārā viññāṇa - ~matter, feeling of pleasant, pain, neither-pain-nor-pleasant, and only then come ~mental phenomena.
In 6 internal bases:
cakkhu soto ghāna jivha kāyo mano - body is placed before mind-representation.
In dependent origination (sn12.2):
avijjā - has a precise definition: not knowing about pain (dukkha) etc.
in definition of sankharas: body, speech, mind (body first)
viññāṇa - 6 types kāyo mano - body comes before mind.
nāma-rūpa name-~matter
name is vedanā, saññā, cetanā, phasso, manasikāro
feeling, perception, volition, contact, attention.
vedana comes first before more ~mental phenomena such as for example cetana and manasikara.
in other condition sequences where body and mind can be distinguished the same principle as with viññāṇa - body or contact comes before mind or phenomenon (Dhamma).
In types of activity (kamma): body, speech, mind (body first)
Based on this principle, it can be understood that bodily pain-discomfort always had first priority, even indirectly, not to mention direct definitions, while "suffering, dissatisfaction" as a reaction or opinion about what is happening on the contrary was never a priority.
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Semantic Divergence
The concept of Semantic Divergence (shift, mismatch) is intended to describe more subtle cases than false cognates* and "false friends of the translator", when word pairs in two languages indeed have similar meaning, and are considered equivalents, but have different semantic cores and cultural overtones. And accordingly the perception of such words by native speakers differs.
Example:
Happiness (English) — a calm state of satisfaction, not necessarily a state of euphoria, ecstasy and exaltation.
Счастье (Russian) — an exalted experience of fullness, meaning of being, delight and highest degree of satisfaction.
It should be taken into account that here we are talking about the meaning of words, not about the state of a particular person. If we try to express in percentages exclusively for clarity the emotional coloring of words, then happiness would be 80% satisfaction, contentment and 20% intensive vivid experience, whereas счастье on the contrary is an emotionally loud state at 80% and 20% peace and measuredness of being, if they are included in the understanding of happiness at all.
That is, the Pali word somanassa with a stretch could be described by the word happiness, but the word счастье would be inappropriate and contradictory, not to mention the word sukkha, which has fundamental meaning as the opposite of dukkha and is defined in the suttas as bodily pleasant.
Katamañca, bhikkhave, sukhindriyaṁ?
And what, monks, is the faculty of pleasure?
Yaṁ kho, bhikkhave, kāyikaṁ sukhaṁ, kāyikaṁ sātaṁ, kāyasamphassajaṁ sukhaṁ sātaṁ vedayitaṁ—
That which, monks, is bodily pleasure, bodily comfort, pleasure comfort born of bodily contact felt —
idaṁ vuccati, bhikkhave, sukhindriyaṁ.
this is called, monks, the faculty of pleasure.
Katamañca, bhikkhave, somanassindriyaṁ?
And what, monks, is the faculty of satisfaction?
Yaṁ kho, bhikkhave, cetasikaṁ sukhaṁ, cetasikaṁ sātaṁ, manosamphassajaṁ sukhaṁ sātaṁ vedayitaṁ—
That which, monks, is mental pleasure, mental comfort, pleasure comfort born of mind contact felt —
idaṁ vuccati, bhikkhave, somanassindriyaṁ.
this is called, monks, the faculty of satisfaction.
sn48.36
In the case of happiness the problem is fundamental along with dukkha, but due to the application of contextual translation, the reader less often but still encounters the translation of the word sukha as pleasant bodily feeling. With taṇhā the case is more severe, and the problem is larger, since the reader has no opportunity to learn that taṇhā is not "thirst" from the English language.
Taṇhā Pali or tṛṣṇā Sanskrit. They indeed can denote clinging, sticking, stickiness, grasping and even need for drinking, but these are phenomena that can be pleasant, light, agreeable, desirable, including in a figurative sense. Whereas "thirst" in English - is loud and mostly negative concept, even when used in positive sense, as "thirst for knowledge" or "thirst for travel". We are talking about the word itself, not about whether it is good to want knowledge or not.
sn56.11 - if taṇhā were a full equivalent of the English word thirst, then this should be either an unpleasant experience of dryness and dehydration, or a strong often passionate striving, need, craving, very focused on the result phenomenon (thirst for life - to preserve life and its quality at any cost, thirst for knowledge - desire to obtain information or experience without paying attention to other benefits).
But in the definition of the Second Noble Truth it is stated that 'taṇhā' is accompanied sahagata literally Pali "goes together" with joy-pleasure and passion-enchantment. Not "pursues joy and passion" - as in case of their lack or "connected with them" - as a potential outcome upon their obtaining, but, as if they were already present in the current experience. Judging by the metaphors with one exhausted from heat and thirst, tasinā would be more appropriate in such a case.
Delighting here-and-there. tatratatrābhinandinī, ~now this, now that rejoicing (usially translated as "delighting"). This quality of finding delight in various things is inconsistent with the strong, one-directional, and result-focused nature of the English word "thirst". A word like "wanting" would be more appropriate to convey this moderate, even pleasant, sense of desire. However, this also presents a problem: both "thirst" and "wanting" create a pleonasm (redundancy) when translating the common Pali compound kāma-taṇhā. Since kāma already means "desire" or "wanting," the compound becomes either the redundant phrase "desire-thirst" or the tautology "wanting-wanting." More on this and other issues below.
An example of a contextual, yet significantly more accurate and appropriate translation of the concept taṇhā, compared to "thirst," can be found in the Taishō Tripiṭaka (Chinese language). There, taṇhā is rendered as "love" (愛), as in the phrase "I love you" (我爱你 — simplified Chinese).
何謂苦習？謂從愛故而令復有樂性，不離在在貪憙，欲愛、色愛、不色之愛，是習為苦。 何謂苦盡？謂覺從愛復有所樂，婬念不受，不念無餘無婬，捨之無復禪，如是為習盡。
Machine translation of the passage
t109
By sacrificing the semantic fields of clinging, stickiness, dryness, or thirsting-for-liquid, the translators nevertheless preserved what matters most — the lightness of the concept and its association with joy-passion. In English, the word "love" is somewhat closer to taṇhā than "thirst," especially in its connotations of desire or craving. However, it still requires important caveats, as it tends to overstate the emotional positivity of the term.
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Issues with Sanskritocentrism
Sanskritocentrism (pan-Sanskritism)* is considered a non-optimal approach for understanding the Buddha's Teaching. The Buddha's Teaching in exhaustive completeness exists in Pali, but not in Sanskrit. Also chronologically it was formulated in Pali earlier. To assume that the conceptual base of Pali - Dhamma and Sanskrit - Hindu base of sacred texts is identical is rash.
Even within one teaching, one religion, divergences in meanings of concepts are so great that separate, sometimes hostile, movements, schools, sects are formed. But at the same time, it is assumed that two languages containing the heritage and burden of many dozens of teachings, schools and many hundreds of sects will coincide down to subtleties and nuances.
Also the imaginary absence of false cognates and "false friends of the translator" between the two languages can serve as a good illustration of the unconvincingness of the pro-Sanskrit approach to Pali. As if someone made an illogical equation: "if languages have similar grammar and many related words, then the key concepts of teachings are also identical".
Atta and Atman serve as a vivid example of obviously existing divergences and non-interchangeability of meanings. Atta (essence, selfhood, ~autonomy, bypassed "I") Pali and Atman (higher "Self") Sanskrit.
It is also enough to look at the comparison of the 31 "body parts", as in dn22 — kesā lomā... vasā kheḷo siṅghāṇikā lasikā muttanti — to see how distant and incommensurable the meanings of seemingly similar words in Pali and Sanskrit can be.
With the above in mind, in cases where Pali texts indeed lack context or examples, Sanskrit still can be used — provided that this does not lead to contradictions like listed below. If definition of concept exists in Pali, but Sanskrit meanings contradict them, then the latter are not applied.
Examples of terminological divergences:
duḥkha, tṛṣṇā, kāma and karma, possibly in some cases are "suffering", "thirst", "sensual desire" and "action" within some teaching recorded in Sanskrit. But in Pali, if primarily for establishing terms Pali texts were taken into account, not literal transfer of meanings and parallels between two languages, this would be unlikely.
Examples from Pali texts:
1. dukkha:
- dn22 - definitions of the concept in the practical realization of the four noble truths
- mn141 - definitions of the concept in the four noble truths.
soka-parideva-dukkha-domanass-upāyāsa
Suffering [meaning 1], lamentation, pain, "suffering" [meaning 2], despair
If we talk about suffering, then in the direct sense it is either soko - very strong bodily and mental pain, in which the experiencer:
socati kilamati paridevati, urattāḷiṁ kandati, sammohaṁ āpajjati
suffers, languishes, cries, beats-breast-weeps, falls into confusion.
or domanassa in the figurative meaning of "suffering", as mental pain.
2. taṇhā:
Two Pali terms — taṇhā and tasinā* — quite mechanically, without considering the context of usage in the Suttas, were attributed full synonymous meaning between themselves and with the Sanskrit tṛṣṇā, although considering what is described in the block about "Semantic shifts", this problem may be connected not with Sanskrit, but with translation of both languages without considering the difference in meanings of words, which can be gleaned from description.
However, mostly "Sanskrit" problem also takes place. The kinship of words tṛṣṇā, taṇhā and tasinā is explained by standard phonetic mutation: tṛṣṇā → taṇhā (there are only about three such words in the entire core of original Pali texts kṛṣṇa → kaṇha, uṣṇa → uṇha) and similarity of tṛṣṇā and tasinā (tṛ → t, ṣ → s, ṇā → nā) is also easy to trace.
But phonetic mutation cannot be a guarantee that the meanings of words are also "transferred", especially since as a result of "mutation" of one word both "receive" completely identical meanings.
A case in point: By way of analogy, this would be like saying: "Because the word 'dry' in Language Z corresponds to both 'dryish' and 'drought' in Language X, it means 'dryish' and 'drought' are complete synonyms."
Divergences in meaning and usage of Pali taṇhā and tasinā between themselves are quite easily traceable in the texts below. taṇhā is used where the phenomenon is associated with joy and passion-enchantment, which delights here-and-there, but tasinā is used in cases with desert, heat and exhaustion in more extreme circumstances.
- sn12.68 - circumstances suitable for real strong "thirst" are described and here a derivative word from tasinā is used, not taṇhā, but if this is a phenomenon related to desire to drink, then there would be pleonasm with pipāsito: thirsty, desiring to drink. in any case, in such a context does not fit "accompanied by joy-passion, here-and-there delighting", which is said many times about taṇhā.
- snp3.2 - same case taṇhā is not used, instead tasina, and same tautology with pipāsā
- an4.10 - also not taṇhā, but tasina, and tautology with pipāsā
- an4.184 - if taṇho - is thirst, then there would be tautology with pipāso, moreover here clearly pipāso has figurative meaning, but when this word is used in direct meaning - it means "desire to drink".
- an3.76 - if taṇho - is thirst, then here misleading oxymoron: thirst as moisture and nourishment
- an3.77 - same as in previous sutta
- sn44.9 - logical contradiction: thirst (hunger for liquid) as nourishment
- an10.62 - what is the nourishment of thirst? Thirst is absence, not nourishment itself
- iti109 - river's flow is thirst. State of water absence is water flow.
- sn41.5 - similar contradiction with water flow
- mn9 - from accumulation of thirst - accumulation of nourishment (logically should be opposite. from disappearance of nourishment - accumulation of thirst, or at least from disappearance of thirst - accumulation of nourishment)
- an4.199 - Listed phenomena are so subtle that on the contrary, thirst can be their result, but to call 'I - am' and further thirst or its currents, in the meaning of 'acute need of something' is very difficult. In this passage we are talking about subtle, fundamental states that are inherent even to beings devoid of 'thirst' in the generally accepted meaning of this word.
- an4.9 - Thirst is not the source of pain, but either one of the types of pain, or on the contrary, it is striving to stop something unpleasant. Otherwise it would turn out that thirst for water is the cause of unpleasant sensations of dryness. But on the contrary, thirst as striving to drink is the result of unpleasant sensations of dryness.
- an6.61 - Listed phenomena including phasso can be so subtle that there can be no talk of any thirst in figurative, or even direct sense of the word, especially in moments of 'quenched thirst', but still these phenomena are stitched and held together, whether there is 'strong wanting' or not.
In Pali texts taṇhā has more complex, more subtle and less loud meaning than English word "thirst" in direct and figurative. And mechanical equation of two Pali terms taṇhā and tasinā with Sanskrit tṛṣṇā.
3. kāma:
- an6.63 - desires as intention-blank-passion, not just multipliers of desire (kama gunas).
- an6.63 (continuation) - desiring person obtains either good or not-good, but "sensual" desires would lead to not-good as they would contain akusalamula: lobha, dosa and/or moha.
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Puriso attha-kāmo hita-kāmo yogakkhema-kāmoti kho, bhikkhave, tathāgatassetaṁ adhivacanaṁ arahato sammāsambuddhassa.
“A person, desiring good, desiring benefit, desiring protection from yoke”, monks, of Tathagata this is the designation, of Arahant, of Rightly Awakened. mn19
it would be inappropriate to assume that Tathagata would compare himself with a person passionately desiring others' good, or his own.
4. kamma:
- an4.237 - Right View, Right Mindfulness, Right Samadhi - do not fit the concept of action, possibly with stretch activity, but obviously these are much more subtle phenomena than only deed, work, action
- an4.238 - Mindfulness-awakening-aspect, rapture-awakening-aspect, tranquility-awakening-aspect, samadhi-awakening-aspect, direct-seeing-awakening-aspect - do not fit the concept of action, possibly with stretch activity, but obviously these are much more subtle phenomena than only deed, work, action
Listed texts show that the Pali terms dukkha, taṇhā / tasinā, kāma, and kamma were never exact equivalents — either of their Sanskrit counterparts or of their standard English translations. Yet precisely "suffering", "thirst", "sensual desire", and "action" are the standard, universally used Buddhist terminology.
