Introduction

In the present chapter I translate and study the treatment of the sixty-two ways of developing views in the Dīrgha-āgama parallel to the Brahmajāla-sutta. After an introductory evaluation of the contrast between holding views and the Tathāgata's transcendence of views, I translate excerpts from the analysis of views in the Chinese Dīrgha-āgama, with each major section of this analysis followed by a comparison with the corresponding section in the other versions extant in Pāli, Sanskrit, Chinese, and Tibetan.[n.1] Owing to the considerable number of parallels, in what follows I only take up selected differences, a comprehensive survey of variations being beyond the scope of the present chapter.

Views and the proper attitude to them are a recurrent theme in the early discourses. Whereas several passages advocate the abandoning of all views, others present right view as an important factor of the path to liberation. Closer inspection shows that what at first sight might seem to be two differing positions turns out to be two complementary facets of the same attitude.

Right view, sammā diṭṭhi, is the first factor of the noble eightfold path. Now the Cūḷavedalla-sutta and its parallels place right view in the aggregate of wisdom.[n.2] MN 44 at MN I 301,9, MĀ 210 at T I 788c11, and D 4094 ju 7b6 or Q 5595 tu 8b5; cf. also Abhidh-k 2.26 in Pradhan 1967: 55,14. Thus right view being the first factor of the noble eightfold path seems to be a deliberate divergence from the usual sequence of the gradual path, which proceeds from morality via concentration to wisdom. This departure from the usual sequence points to the preliminary function of right view as the indispensable directional input for a proper practice of the path. The Mahācattārīsakā-sutta and its parallels quite explicitly highlight this role of sammā diṭṭhi by presenting right view as the precursor to the entire path.[n.3] MN 117 at MN III 71,22: sammādiṭṭhi pubbaṅgamā hoti, MĀ 189 at T I 735c13: 正見最在其前, and D 4094 nyu 44b6 or Q 5595 thu 84a8: yang dag pa’i lta ba sngon du ’gro ba.

According to the definition of the noble eightfold path in the Saccavibhaṅga-sutta and its parallel, right view stands for insight into the four noble truths.[n.4] E.g. MN 141 at MN III 251,12 and its parallel MĀ 31 at T I 469a15. Applied to the human predicament, right view recognizes the existence of dukkha, detects its cause to be craving, identifies the remedy to be the removal of craving, and prescribes the noble eightfold path as the way to liberation. In sum, right view involves the clear recognition that any form of craving or attachment will inevitably lead to dukkha.

Applied in the context of the ancient Indian setting, this recognition of the role of craving and attachment provides a decisive perspective on views in general. The repercussions of holding a view with craving and attachment are thematized in the Aṭṭhakavagga of the Sutta-nipāta, for example, which repeatedly emphasizes the need to go beyond views.[n.5] [6] Cf. in more detail the publications mentioned above p. 103 note 7; a translation of the Chinese counterpart can be found in Bapat 1945 and 1950. This emphasis is but an implementation of right view in the sense of the four noble truths, inasmuch as the point is to recognize how craving and attachment manifest in dogmatic adherence to views. That is, sammā diṭṭhi is "sammā" to the extent to which it sees through craving and attachment – ideally even in regard to Buddhist viewpoints and positions.

The need to leave behind views in the sense of dogmatic adherence and attachment, and the concomitant need to be endowed with right view by way of a clear vision (and gradual deepening of appreciation) of the four noble truths, is brought out in the concluding verse of the Metta-sutta in the Sutta-nipāta. This verse describes the one who goes beyond rebirth in a womb as one who does not "go into views", but at the same time is virtuous and "endowed with vision".[n.6] [7] Sn 152: diṭṭhiñ ca anupagamma sīlavā dassanena sampanno. In the Pāli original, this involves a word play on the derivatives of √dṛś, where "views", diṭṭhi, is contrasted to "vision", dassana.

The same word play recurs in the Aggivacchagotta-sutta, according to which the Tathāgata has put away "views", diṭṭhi, since he has "seen", diṭṭha, the impermanent nature of the five aggregates.[n.7] [8] MN 72 at MN I 486,12: diṭṭhaṃ h'etaṃ … tathāgatena: iti rūpaṃ … vedanā … saññā … saṅkhārā … viññāṇaṃ, iti viññāṇassa samudayo, iti viññāṇassa atthagamo. Parallels to the Aggivacchagotta-sutta in the two Chinese Saṃyukta-āgama translations and in Tibetan translation provide a complementary perspective on the same matter, as according to them the vision of the Tathāgata concerns the four noble truths.[n.8] [9] SĀ 962 at T II 245c22: 見此苦聖諦, 此苦集聖諦, 此苦滅聖諦, 此苦滅道跡 聖諦, SĀ² 196 at T II 445b9: 見苦聖諦, 見苦集諦, 見苦滅諦, 見至苦滅道諦, and D 4094 ju 157b6 or Q 5595 tu 182a7: sdug bsngal ’phags pa’i bden pa’o zhes yang dag pa’i shes rab kyis ci lta ba bzhin mthong zhing, ’di ni sdug bsngal kun ’byung ba’o, ’di ni sdug bsngal ’gog pa’o, ’di ni sdug bsngal ’gog par ’gro ba’i lam. Whether it be the Tathāgata's vision of the impermanent nature of the five aggregates or of the four noble truths, his vision is reckoned to be of such nature that it leaves behind entanglement in views.

The Tathāgata's transcendence of entanglement in views is in fact the central theme of the Aggivacchagotta-sutta and its parallels, which contrast what views have to say about the Tathāgata to what the Tathāgata has to say about views. What views have to say about the Tathāgata takes the form of the tetralemma. As already mentioned in the previous chapter, this presentation presumes the future destiny of a Tathāgata to be describable in one out of four alternative logical propositions, tetralemma.[n.9] [10] Cf. above p. 105. The first two of these propositions can be seen to underlie the query posed in the Kaṭha Upaniṣad, Kaṭh Up 1.20: yeyam prete vicikitsā manuṣye 'stīty eke nāyam astīti caike, translated by Radhakrishnan 1953/1992: 603 as "there is this doubt in regard to a man who has departed, some (holding) that he is and some that he is not"; ibid. explains that the query "is about the condition of the liberated soul", cf. also Rhys Davids 1899: 46 note 2. These are:

• the Tathāgata exists after death,
• the Tathāgata does not exist after death,
• the Tathāgata exists and does not exist after death,
• the Tathāgata neither exists nor does not exist after death.

To the bewilderment of his visitor, who had hoped the Buddha would make a pronouncement on the nature of the Tathāgata in accordance with one or another of these four possibilities, according to the Aggivacchagotta-sutta and its parallels the Buddha refused to take up any of these positions. The motivation for this refusal – that is, what the Tathāgata has to say about views – appears to have two aspects, both of which relate to the problem of mistaken premises, already mentioned in the previous chapter.

One of these two aspects is that to take up any of these positions is to fall prey to the entanglement of views. According to the Aggivacchagotta-sutta and its Tibetan parallel, such entanglement is not conducive to liberation,[n.10] [11] MN 72 at MN I 485,31 and D 4094 ju 157b2 or Q 5595 tu 181b8. a point made in the parallels in the Saṃyukta-āgama by indicating that such entanglement will lead to future birth, old age, and death.[n.11] [12] SĀ 962 at T II 245c14 and SĀ2 196 at T II 445b4. The other aspect is that a Tathāgata is by his very nature beyond being identified with any of the five aggregates even while he is alive, let alone attempting to identify him after death.[n.12] [13] Karunadasa 1994: 8 explains that "to predicate whether something exists or not one should be able to identify it … [but] there is no identifiable selfentity called Tathāgata, either to be perpetuated or annihilated after 'death'", wherefore any statement made about a Tathāgata after death becomes meaningless. Trying to predicate the existence or non-existence of a Tathāgata after death is, according to the Aggivacchagotta-sutta and its parallels, comparable to trying to predicate the direction in which a fire has gone once it has been extinguished.[n.13] [14] MN 72 at MN I 487,11, SĀ 962 at T II 245c28, SĀ2 196 at T II 445b17, and D 4094 ju 158a2 or Q 5595 tu 182b2.

The contrast between entanglement in views and the Tathāgata's aloofness from views, depicted in the Aggivacchagotta-sutta and its parallels, receives a more detailed treatment in the Brahmajāla-sutta and its parallels. After a survey of matters related to the Buddha's moral conduct as possible instances of praise, [n.14] Cf. above p. 63ff. the Brahmajāla-sutta and its parallels present a penetrative analysis of views as something that has a more justified claim to praise than moral conduct. This part of the Brahmajāla-sutta and its parallels thereby draws out in detail the contrast between views and the Tathāgata, showing how certain experiences or ways of reasoning may lead to various views, all of which have been utterly transcended by the Tathāgata.

The Brahmajāla-sutta, being the first discourse in the Dīgha-nikāya,[n.15] DN 1 at DN I 1,1 to 46,29. has a Chinese counterpart in the twenty-first discourse of the Dīrgha-āgama preserved in Chinese.[n.16] This is the "discourse on the stirring of Brahmā", 梵動經, DĀ 21 at T I 88b12 to 94a13 (where the "stirring", cāla, appears to be a translation error for "net", jāla; cf. above p. 61 note 21). My translation and study of DĀ 21 and of the Tibetan discourse builds on the pioneering research on these two versions undertaken by Weller 1933, 1934, 1935, and 1971. In general terms, the section on views in the Dīrgha-āgama discourse is fairly similar to its Pāli parallel. A difference in diction is that the Dīrgha-āgama version shows recurrent irregularities, in the sense that standard passages and expressions, on being repeated, are not always worded in the same manner.[n.17] [19&20] Thus the introductions to otherwise similar statements can vary at times, or expressions like "knowing and seeing" or "putting forth a doctrine and a view" may come in the opposite sequence as "seeing and knowing" and "putting forth a view and a doctrine", etc. This appears to be a typical feature of the Dīrgha-āgama, cf. also Meisig 1990 for a discussion of irregularities in Dīrgha-āgama renderings of proper names. According to Zürcher 1991: 288, in the case of early Chinese translations "there is a strong tendency to avoid the monotonous effect of … the verbatim repetition of whole passages, by introducing a certain amount of diversification and irregularity", as a result of which "in the same translated scripture we often find various alternative forms … of the same cliché." Such variations, however, do not affect the content of the presentation.

Another version of the Brahmajāla-sutta is extant as an individual translation, in the sense of being a discourse translated into Chinese on its own, without being part of a translation of a discourse collection.[n.18] [21] This is the "discourse (spoken by the Buddha on) Brahmā's net of sixtytwo views", 佛說梵網六十二見經, T 21 at T I 264a20 to 270c22. The attribution of this translation to Zhī Qiān (支謙) is doubtful, as Nattier 2008: 121 does not include T 21 in her list of his authentic works. Sections of the Brahmajāla-sutta have also been preserved in Sanskrit fragments.[n.19] [23] Cf. SHT III 803 and SHT III 882b (which, as noted by Skilling 1997: 470 note 8, could also be parallel to MN 102), Waldschmidt et al. 1971: 5–7 and 131f, SHT V 1571, Sander and Waldschmidt 1985: 262f, Hartmann 1989: 46– 57, SHT VI 1248 and SHT VI 1356, Bechert and Wille 1989: 48 and 95, Hartmann 1991: 78–90 (§§13–16) and 2002: 135f, SHT X 4189, Wille 2008: 307, Or 15009/ 217, Ye 2009: 240, and Or 15007/107, Wille 2015: 42. As mentioned in a previous chapter, the Sanskrit version of the Brahmajāla-sūtra appears to have been the last discourse in the Mūlasarvāstivāda Dīrgha-āgama.[n.20] [24] Cf. above p. 81 note 4. A version of the Brahmajāla-sūtra is also extant in Tibetan translation.[n.21] [25] This is the "discourse on the net of Brahmā", tshangs pa’i dra ba’i mdo, which has been edited together with its Mongolian translation by Weller 1934. On the basis of translation terminology employed in the Tibetan version, Weller 1933: 197f comes to the conclusion that the original used for translation would have been in Sanskrit, derived from an earlier version in Prākrit.

In addition to these discourses, the Brahmajāla treatment is also found as a quotation in two later works. One of these is the *Śāriputrābhidharma, a treatise preserved only in Chinese and apparently stemming from the Dharmaguptaka tradition. [n.22] [26] T 1548 at T XXVIII 656b19 to 661a7 only has the examination of views, introduced as being the "sixty-two views, as spoken in the discourse on Brahmā's net", 六十二見, 如梵網經說. On the probability that the *Śāriputrābhidharma stems from the Dharmaguptaka tradition cf. Bareau 1950 and below p. 142 note 62. The relevant portion covers the entire treatment of views, without, however, the introductory narration and the section on morality. The other quotation is found in Śamathadeva's Abhidharmakośopāyikā-ṭīkā extant in Tibetan translation, which gives the Brahmajāla-sūtra in its entirety.[n.23] [28] The quotation of at D 4094 ju 141b5 to 153b7 or Q 5595 tu 162b6 to 177b2 is introduced by the title tshangs pa’i dra ba.

In what follows, I translate the analysis of views from the Dīrgha-āgama version section by section, [n.24] [29] The translated section begins at T I 89c19. alternating between translation and comparison of the main features of each section with its parallels, together with an evaluation of the significance of the respective presentation. Within the context of the discourse as a whole, the studied portion sets in by highlighting that, compared with the Buddha's exemplary moral conduct described in the preceding sections, the Buddha's penetrative insight into views is a more profound matter and therefore more worthy of praise. This serves as an introduction to the first type of views examined in the Brahmajāla, views about the past that uphold eternalism.

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I. Views Related to the Past – Eternalism[n.25] [30] Headings provided here and elsewhere are not found in the original.

The Buddha told the monks: "There are still other teachings, very profound, sublime, and greatly illuminating teachings. Only a noble disciple is able to praise the Tathāgata for these.[n.26] [31] Adopting the variant 法 instead of 言. What are those very profound, sublime, and greatly illuminating teachings, because of which a noble disciple is able to praise the Tathāgata?

The Tathāgata and Views

"Recluses and brahmins who have views about the past and ⟨speculations⟩ about the past and have views about the future and ⟨speculations⟩ about the future,[n.27] [32] DĀ 21 at T I 89c23: 本劫本見, 末劫末見, where my emendation of "aeon" to become "speculation" is based on the assumption that the use of 劫 is due to a confusion of ˚kappika with kappa. diverse and innumerable, declared in accordance with their mental dispositions, are all comprised among sixty-two views. Views about the past and ⟨speculations⟩ about the past as well as views about the future and ⟨speculations⟩ about the future, diverse and innumerable, declared in accordance with mental dispositions, cannot go beyond being among these sixty-two views.

"For what reasons do recluses and brahmins have those views about the past and ⟨speculations⟩ about the past and have views about the future and ⟨speculations⟩ about the future, diverse and innumerable, each declared in accordance with their mental dispositions, not going beyond being comprised among these sixty-two views at all?

"Recluses and brahmins have views about the past and ⟨speculations⟩ about the past, diverse and innumerable, declared in accordance with their mental dispositions, which can all be comprised among eighteen views. These views about the past and ⟨speculations⟩ about the past, diverse and innumerable, declared in accordance with mental dispositions, cannot go beyond being among these eighteen views.

"For what reason do recluses and brahmins have those views about the past and ⟨speculations⟩ about the past, diverse and innumerable, each declared in accordance with their mental dispositions, not going beyond being comprised among these eighteen views at all?

"Recluses and brahmins who have views about the past and ⟨speculations⟩ about the past, propounding a doctrine of eternalism, proclaim that 'the self and the world exist eternally', which are all comprised among four views. These views about the past and ⟨speculations⟩ about the past, proclaiming that 'the self and the world exist eternally', do not go beyond being comprised among these four views at all.

"For what reasons do recluses and brahmins have those views about the past and ⟨speculations⟩ about the past, propounding a doctrine of eternalism, proclaiming that 'the self and the world exist eternally', not going beyond being comprised among these four views at all?

I.1[n.28] [33] Numbers provided here and elsewhere in the translation are not found in the original. "Some recluses and brahmins by various means attain a meditative concentration of the mind. Relying on their concentrated mind they recollect twenty aeons of evolution and dissolution. They [then] declare: 'The self and the world are eternal, this is true and all else is false.' Why is that so? By relying on various means I attained a meditative concentration of the mind. Relying on this concentrated mind I recollected twenty aeons of evolution and dissolution. Therein the [number of] living beings neither increased nor decreased, [n.29] Silk 2015a: 15f highlights that the notion of beings neither increasing nor decreasing has precedents in the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad. they were always together and did not disperse. From this I know that 'the self and the world are eternal, this is true and all else is false.'

"This is the first view by recluses and brahmins who, because of having views about the past and ⟨speculations⟩ about the past, speculate that 'the self and the world exist eternally', not going beyond being comprised among these four views at all.

I.2 "Some recluses and brahmins by various means attain a meditative concentration of the mind. Relying on their concentrated mind they recollect forty aeons of evolution and dissolution. They [then] declare: 'The self and the world are eternal, this is true and all else is false.' Why is that so? By relying on various means I attained a meditative concentration of the mind. Relying on this concentrated mind I recollected forty aeons of evolution and dissolution. Therein the [number of] living beings neither increased nor decreased, they were always together and did not disperse. From this I know that 'the self and the world are eternal, this is true and all else is false.'

"This is the second view by recluses and brahmins who, because of having views about the past and ⟨speculations⟩ about the past, speculate that 'the self and the world exist eternally', not going beyond being comprised among these four views at all.

I.3 "Some recluses and brahmins by various means attain a meditative concentration of the mind. Relying on their concentrated mind they recollect eighty aeons of evolution and dissolution. They [then] declare: 'The self and the world are eternal, this is true and all else is false.' Why is that so? By relying on various means I attained a meditative concentration of the mind. Relying on this concentrated mind I recollected eighty aeons of evolution and dissolution. Therein the [number of] living beings neither increased nor decreased, they were always together and did not disperse. From this I know that 'the self and the world are eternal, this is true and all else is false.'

"This is the third view by recluses and brahmins who, because of having views about the past and ⟨speculations⟩ about the past, speculate that 'the self and the world exist eternally', not going beyond being comprised among these four views at all.

I.4 "Some recluses and brahmins have swift discriminative knowledge and are skilled at examination. Relying on their swift discriminative knowledge and various means of examination, they reckon their observations to be truth. Relying on their own views, relying on their own discernment, they declare: 'The self and the world are eternal.'

"This is the fourth view by recluses and brahmins who, because of having views about the past and ⟨speculations⟩ about the past, speculate that 'the self and the world exist eternally', not going beyond being comprised among these four views at all.

"Recluses and brahmins, who have views about the past and ⟨speculations⟩ about the past, speculate that 'the self and the world exist eternally', are like this completely comprised among these four views. [Views] that 'the self and the world are eternal' do not go beyond being among these four views at all.

"Only a Tathāgata knows the compass of these views, how they are upheld, how they are grasped, and he also knows their result. The Tathāgata's knowledge goes still beyond that, and even though he has such knowledge he is not attached to it. Being already without attachment and having attained quiescence, he knows the arising of feelings, their cessation, their gratification, their disadvantage, and the escape from them. By way of this unbiased vision he has been liberated without remainder, for which reason he is called a Tathāgata. This is another very profound, sublime, and greatly illuminating principle, for which a noble disciple truly and in an unbiased way praises the Tathāgata."

Regarding these four grounds for arriving at eternalist views, a major difference in the various versions of the Brahmajāla can be found in regard to the last ground. The Pāli and the Dīrgha-āgama versions agree in identifying theoretical speculation as the fourth source for eternalist views, a presentation also found in the *Śāriputrābhidharma. The individual Chinese translation, however, describes how someone develops concentration.[n.30] [35] T 21 at T I 266a26: "energetically he [develops] quietness and one-pointedness of the mind, practising the overcoming of evil activities he promptly [attains] such a mental concentration of the mind that [although] a basis in recollection and quietness has been established, his recollection [of the past] is confounded." My rendering of the expression 如其像, literally "that kind of image", follows the suggestion made in general by Kuan 2007: 191 note 24 that this would render an equivalent to tathārūpa, "such", found in the present case in DN 1 at DN I 13,13 in the expression tathārūpaṃ cetosamādhiṃ phusati. Although this person does not succeed in developing any recollection of the past, his proclamation of the eternal nature of the self and the world is nevertheless related to some degree of meditation practice.

In the two Tibetan versions, the fourth ground for eternalist views clearly involves meditation practice. In this case, such meditation practice has led to the exercise of the divine eye, with the help of which the recluse or brahmin in question sees beings passing away and being reborn.[n.31] [36] Weller 1934: 20,9: lha’i mig rnam par dag pa mi’i las ’das pas sems can ’chi ba dang, skye ba dang … lta ste and D 4094 ju 144a4 or Q 5595 tu 165b5: lha’i mig rnam par dag pas sems can rnams kyi ’chi ’pho ba dang, skye ba dang … mthong nas. That is, from the perspective of these two versions the alternative to recollection of the past is not theoretical speculation, but rather meditative proficiency that enables witnessing the passing away and re-arising of beings.

In the case of the other three grounds for eternalist views, however, the different versions are in close agreement in that recollection of the past is responsible for affirming eternalism. What makes the difference between these three cases is the time period recollected, which in the Pāli version is up to several hundred thousand births, up to ten aeons, and up to forty aeons. According to the Dīrgha-āgama account, the three time periods are twenty, forty, or eighty aeons. The individual Chinese translation, the Tibetan discourse, and the quotations in the *Śāriputrābhidharma and in Śamathadeva's Abhidharmakośopāyikā-ṭīkā agree with the Dīrgha-āgama version in listing time periods of twenty, forty, and eighty aeons.[n.32] [37] A difference in T 21 is that whereas the twenty aeons are of the past, T I 266a14: 過去二十劫事, the forty aeons are of the future, T I 266a18: 當來四 十劫事, and the eighty aeons are of the past and the future, T I 266a23: 過去 當來八十劫事. This is curious, since to be able to foresee the future would involve a form of determinism that is not compatible with the early Buddhist teachings on causality (cf. in more detail Anālayo 2006a: 5). Hence this presentation is probably best considered due to some error in transmission or translation during which an original expression similar to the Pāli saṃvaṭṭa-vivaṭṭa was misunderstood to intend the future and the past.

Looking back on the four cases examined so far in the Brahmajāla analysis, it is noteworthy that the view arrived at in all cases is the same view, an affirmation of eternalism. From this it follows that, even though the Brahmajāla treatment works through altogether sixty-two cases, the actual number of views in the Brahmajāla is less than sixty-two. Although a reference to the Brahmajāla in the Isidatta-sutta speaks of "sixty-two views",[n.33] [38] SN 41.3 at SN IV 287,12: dvāsaṭṭhidiṭṭhigatāni brahmajāle bhaṇitāni; the parallel SĀ 570 at T II 151a20 only refers to the views, without mentioning the Brahmajāla by name or the count of sixty-two. the Pāli version of the Brahmajāla-sutta itself does not speak of "sixty-two views", but rather of "sixty-two grounds for views", the term used being vatthu.[n.34] [39] DN 1 at DN I 39,13. Whereas the Chinese versions employ 見, a standard rendering for derivatives of √dṛś, the Tibetan discourse uses gzhi and Śamathadeva's Abhidharmakośopāyikā- ṭīkā employs dngos po, which, similarly to the Pāli vatthu, stand for the "ground" that leads to the arising of a view.[n.35] [40] Franke 1913a: 22 note 14 comments that vatthu in the present discourse, in addition to meaning "ground", can also carry the nuances of being a "point of view", a "way", a "mode", or a "perspective" ("Gesichtspunkt", "Weise", "Form", "Hinsicht"). Thus the Brahmajāla exposition does not fix the possible number of views to sixty-two, but only employs sixty-two instances in order to survey the grounds responsible for view-formation.

In fact the count of views held in ancient India tends to vary. The Jain tradition knew of altogether three-hundred-sixty-three views.[n.36] [42] Sūyagaḍa 2.2.79; cf. Schubring 2004: 74. The pilgrim Fǎxiǎn (法顯) reports that he came across ninety-six heretical views,[n.37] [41] T 2085 at T LI 861a8: 此中國有九十六種外道. Deeg 2005: 310 note 1512 draws attention to a passage in the Sarvāstivāda *Vinayavibhāṣā, which arrives at the same number by counting fifteen groups led by disciples of each of the six heretical teachers. When added to the followers of each teacher himself, this then leads to six times sixteen, hence ninety-six, T 1440 at T XXIII 536a22: 六師者, 一師十五種教, 以授弟子… 師與弟子通為十六種, 如是六師有九十六種 (adopting a variant for the last character). a count also reflected in a Pāli commentary and a commentary extant in a Gāndhārī fragment.[n.38] Cf. Spk II 401,10 and Baums 2009: 515f.

A variant count can also be found in a verse in the Sutta-nipāta, which speaks of sixty-three heresies.[n.39] [43] Sn 538: yāni ca tīṇi yāni ca saṭṭhi … osaraṇāni. The commentary attempts to make this tally with the Brahmajāla-sutta by explaining that personality view (sakkāyadiṭṭhi) should be added to the sixty-two instances that have been covered in the Brahmajāla-sutta.[n.40] [44] Pj II 434,26: yasmā sakkāyadiṭṭhiyā saha brahmajāle vuttadvāsaṭṭhidiṭṭhigatāni gahetvā tesaṭṭhi honti. Yet, according to the Isidatta-sutta personality view rather underlies all the views analysed in the Brahmajāla.[n.41] [45] SN 41.3 at SN IV 287,13: imā … diṭṭhiyo sakkāyadiṭṭhiyā sati honti, sakkāyadiṭṭhiyā asati na honti, and its parallel SĀ 570 at T II 151a21: 一切皆以 身見為本, 身見集, 身見生, 身見轉; cf. also the *Mahāvibhāṣā, T 1545 at T XXVII 406c12: 身見是六十二見趣根本. Hence personality view could not be reckoned as something in addition to the sixty-two.

The symbolic nature of the count of sixty-two extends even to the grounds for views. These would also not amount to sixty-two, since the first three grounds for views are all recollection of past lives. What causes a treatment in a threefold manner is variations in the time period that is recollected, variations that do not really make a difference in relation to the mode in which the respective view arises.[n.42] [46] Maithrimurthi 1999: 134 note 8 comments that, in order to arrive at a total count of four, at times the exposition in the Brahmajāla-sutta seems to have incorporated additional grounds that do not necessarily add to the content of the exposition. According to Syrkin 1983: 157f the Brahmajāla-sutta shows "an evident tendency to use fours or the multiples of four", adjusting the number of grounds to this pattern. If one were to combine the time periods mentioned in the different versions – several hundred thousand births, ten aeons, twenty aeons, forty aeons, and eighty aeons – one could with equal justification distinguish recollection of the past into five cases. In other words, the first three cases mentioned in the Brahmajāla treatment amount to just a single cause for the arising of eternalist views, namely recollection of past lives.

This goes to show that the purpose of the Brahmajāla analysis is not to establish the number sixty-two, be these sixty-two views or sixty-two grounds for views. Its purpose is rather to analyse how views arise, for which it employs a framework of sixty-two instances. In fact, since according to the Isidatta-sutta personality view is the underlying cause for the arising of all these views, one could even speak of a single ground responsible for all of the views depicted in the entire Brahmajāla. Or else, in order to stay within the confines of the Brahmajāla exposition itself, a single ground for all types of views would be ignorance of the true nature of feelings. This ignorance is highlighted in the concluding passage after each set of views or grounds for views examined in the Brahmajāla treatment, to which I return later.

Before turning to the Tathāgata's insight into the true nature of feeling as the decisive contrast to the view-forming process, however, the remaining grounds for the formulation of views in the Brahmajāla need to be examined. The next of these are proclamations of partial eternalism.[n.43] The translation continues from T I 90b16.

"There are still other very profound, sublime, and greatly illuminating teachings, for which a noble disciple truly and in an unbiased way praises the Tathāgata. What are these?

"Recluses and brahmins, who have views about the past and ⟨speculations⟩ about the past, propound a doctrine and proclaim that 'the self and the world are partially eternal and partially impermanent.'[n.44] [47] DĀ 21 at T I 90b19: 半常半無常; literally: "half eternal and half impermanent", which I take to be intended in a figurative sense, since the first actual view proposes eternal status only for a single living being, in contrast to the impermanent nature of all other living beings. Recluses and brahmins who, because of having these views about the past and ⟨speculations⟩ about the past, speculate that 'the self and the world are partially eternal and partially impermanent' do not go beyond being among these four views at all.[n.45] [48] Adopting a variant without 或過.

II.1 "There is a certain time, at the beginning of an aeon, when the merit of some living being comes to an end, his lifeforce comes to an end, and his [vital] formation comes to an end. With the ending of life in the Ābhassara realm, he is reborn in an empty Brahmā world. Being reborn in this realm, he in turn craves with a mental state of attachment, further having the wish for other living beings to be reborn in this realm. Once this already born living being has given rise to such a wish out of craving and attachment, subsequently other living beings, whose life-force, [vital] formation, and merit have come to an end, with the ending of their life in the Ābhassara realm come to be reborn in the empty Brahmā world.

"Then the first reborn living being thinks in turn: 'I am Brahmā in this realm, the great Brahmā, I exist on my own, it is impossible to create me. I fully know all meanings and teachings, I am omnipotent among the thousand world realms and most worthy of respect, being one who is able to manifest [others], the most sublime one and the father of living beings.' At first I was here alone, the other living beings came later. Of those later [born] living beings, I am the creator.'

"Moreover, those later [born] living beings think: 'That is the great Brahmā, who is able to create himself and who is not created by others. He fully knows all meanings and teachings, he is omnipotent among the thousand world realms and most worthy of respect, being one who is able to manifest [others], the most sublime one and the father of living beings. At first he was there alone and we [came into] existence later. He created us living beings.'

"Such a living being in the Brahmā world, whose life-force and [vital] formation have come to an end, is reborn in the next life in the human world. Having come of age, having shaved off his hair and beard, donned the three robes, and left the household life to practise the path, he attains a meditative concentration of the mind. With this concentration of the mind he consequently recollects his past births and in turn declares:

"'The great Brahmā is able to create himself, he is not created by others. He fully knows all meanings and teachings, he is omnipotent among the thousand world realms, being most worthy of respect, one who is able to manifest [others], being the most sublime one and the father of living beings. He remains eternally and does not change, and that Brahmā has created us. We are impermanent and [subject to] change, we do not attain lasting stability. For that reason one should know that 'the self and the world are partially eternal and partially impermanent, this is true and all else is false.'

"This is reckoned the first view by recluses and brahmins who, because of having views about the past and ⟨speculations⟩ about the past, propound the doctrine that 'the self and the world are partially eternal and partially impermanent', not going beyond being among these four views at all.

II.2 "Some living beings are corrupted by pleasure,[n.46] [50] DĀ 21 at T I 90c15: 喜戲笑懈怠, which, as noted by Weller 1971: 231 note 151, Akanuma 1930/1994: 305 identifies as a rendering of khiḍḍāpadosikā. A description of these and the next class of devas can also be found in the Pāṭika-sutta and its Dīrgha-āgama parallel, DN 24 at DN III 31,5 and DĀ 15 at T I 69b28; and in the *Mahāvibhāṣā, T 1545 at T XXVII 190c18. Both are also referred to in the Mahāsamaya-sutta, DN 20 at DN II 260,15, and its parallels; cf. Skilling 1997: 532. in manifold ways they play, laugh, and amuse themselves. At the time of playing, laughing, and amusing themselves, the body [of one of them] becomes in turn extremely tired and he loses his senses.[n.47] [51] DĀ 21 at T I 90c16: 失意, literally they "lose their mind". DN 1 at DN I 19,14 speaks of mindfulness being lost, sati mussati. On losing his senses his life in turn comes to an end. He comes to be reborn in the human world and, having come of age, having shaved off his hair and beard, donned the three robes, and left the household life to practise the path, he attains a meditative concentration of the mind. Relying on this concentration of the mind he recollects his past birth and in turn declares:

"'Those other living beings,[n.48] [52] Adopting a variant without 生不數. who do not frequently play, laugh, and amuse themselves, they remain eternally in that realm, they exist forever and do not change. Because we frequently played and laughed, we came to be impermanent like this and subject to change. Therefore I know that 'the self and the world are partially eternal and partially impermanent, this is true and all else is false.'

"This is the second view by recluses and brahmins who, because of having views about the past and ⟨speculations⟩ about the past, propound the doctrine that 'the self and the world are partially eternal and partially impermanent', not going beyond being among these four views at all.

II.3 "Some living beings, after having looked at each other's characteristics, in turn lose their senses, wherefore their life comes to an end. [One of them] comes to be reborn in the human world and, having come of age, having shaved off his hair and beard, donned the three robes, and left the household life to practise the path, he attains a meditative concentration of the mind. Relying on this concentration of the mind, he recollects his past birth and in turn makes the following declaration:

"'As for those living beings who do not lose their senses, because they do not look at each other's characteristics, they exist eternally and do not change. We frequently looked at those characteristics [of others] and, having frequently looked at the characteristics [of others], we in turn lost our senses, came to be impermanent like this and subject to change. Therefore I know that 'the self and the world are partially eternal and partially impermanent, this is true and all else is false.'

"This is the third view by recluses and brahmins who, because of having views about the past and ⟨speculations⟩ about the past, propound the doctrine that 'the self and the world are partially eternal and partially impermanent', not going beyond being among these four views at all.

II.4 "Some recluses and brahmins have swift discriminative knowledge and are skilled at examination. Relying on swift examination and discriminative knowledge, relying on their own knowledge and arguments, they proclaim: 'The self and the world are partially eternal and partially impermanent, this is true and all else is false.'

"This is the fourth view by recluses and brahmins who, because of having views about the past and ⟨speculations⟩ about the past, propound the doctrine that 'the self and the world are partially eternal and partially impermanent', not going beyond being among these four views at all.

"Recluses and brahmins, who have views about the past and ⟨speculations⟩ about the past, propound the doctrine that the self and the world are partially eternal and partially impermanent, do not go beyond being comprised among these four views at all.

"Only the Buddha is able to know the compass of these views, how they are upheld and how they are grasped, and he also knows their result. The Tathāgata's knowledge goes still beyond that and even though he has such knowledge he is not attached to it. Relying on his being without attachment and having attained quiescence, he knows the arising of feelings, their cessation, their gratification, their disadvantage, and the escape from them. By way of this unbiased vision he has been liberated without remainder, for which reason he is called a Tathāgata. This is another very profound, sublime, and greatly illuminating principle, for which a noble disciple truly and in an unbiased way praises the Tathāgata."

In regard to the four ways of arriving at partially eternalist views, the Dīgha-nikāya and Dīrgha-āgama versions are in general agreement, an agreement shared by the *Śāriputrābhidharma. Whereas the description of the first ground in the Dīrgha-āgama and in the *Śāriputrābhidharma sets in somewhat abruptly with the beginning of an aeon and the exhaustion of merit of a living being, the other versions provide further background to this situation. According to the Pāli account, at the end of the preceding aeon the world had contracted and living beings had mostly been reborn in the Ābhassara realm. Once the world expanded again the rebirth of a single being in the empty Brahmā world took place. The tale of how Brahmā came to mistakenly believe himself to be a creator, a parody on the creation myth in the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad,[n.49] [53] Norman 1991/1993b: 272 explains that "in the Brahmajālasutta the Buddha jokes about the way in which Brahmā thinks that he has created other beings, and he makes reference to the creation myth in the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad." A few verses relevant to this myth are BṛĀr Up 1.2.1: naiveha kiṃcanāgra āsīt, translated by Radhakrishnan 1953/1992: 151 as "there was nothing whatsoever here in the beginning"; BṛĀr Up 1.4.1: so 'nuvīkṣya nānyad ātmano 'paśyat, ibid. p. 163: "looking around he saw nothing else than the self"; BṛĀr Up 1.4.3: sa vai naiva reme … sa dvitīyam aicchat, ibid. p. 164: "he, verily, had no delight … he desired a second"; and (after successful creation of another) BṛĀr Up 1.4.5: so 'vet, ahaṃ vāva sṛṣṭir asmi, ahaṃ hīdaṃ sarvam asṛkṣīti, ibid. p. 165: "he knew, I indeed am this creation for I produced all this." is also found in the Pāṭika-sutta and its Dīrgha-āgama parallel.[n.50] [54] DN 24 at DN III 29,1 and DĀ 15 at T I 69b2.

In regard to the remaining grounds for views, a minor difference can be found in regard to the third case, where the Dīrgha-āgama version and the *Śāriputrābhidharma only indicate that the respective beings pass away because of looking at each other. The Pāli discourse, in agreement with the other versions, additionally specifies that they get upset after looking at each other,[n.51] [55] DN 1 at DN I 20,17. T 21 at T I 266c17 also indicates that anger arises in them on looking at each other, as do the Tibetan versions Weller 1934: 30,25 and D 4094 ju 146b3 or Q 5595 tu 168b3; cf. also fragment Pelliot bleu 258 Vc in Hartmann 1991: 84 (§15). and it appears to be their getting upset that causes them to fall from their heavenly realm. In this way, the previously mentioned living beings, who fall from their condition owing to excessive delight, and the present case, where a fall is caused by becoming upset, mirror the exhortation given at the outset of the discourse by the Buddha to his monks to be neither delighted at praise nor upset at blame.

Another minor difference between the Dīrgha-āgama and the Dīgha-nikāya version is that the latter offers a more detailed account of the fourth case of theoretical speculation. According to the Pāli discourse, the theoretician arrives at the conclusion that the self and the world are partially eternal and partially not eternal because he thinks that the bodily senses are impermanent whereas the mind does not change and remains forever.[n.52] [56] DN 1 at DN I 21,21: yañ ca kho idaṃ vuccati cittan ti vā mano ti vā viññāṇan ti vā, ayaṃ attā nicco dhuvo sassato avipariṇāmadhammo.

A similar notion is found as the second view in the individual Chinese translation, the Tibetan discourse, and the discourse quotation in Śamathadeva's Abhidharmakośopāyikā-ṭīkā. A difference is that according to the Tibetan versions the contrast is not between the bodily senses and the mind, but between the material elements and the mind.[n.53] [57] The Tibetan versions, Weller 1934: 26,22 and D 4094 ju 145b6 or Q 5595 tu 167b5, provide the contrast to the four elements by employing the three terms sems, yid, and rnam par shes pa, corresponding to citta, mano, and viññāṇa listed in the Pāli version. In the individual Chinese translation, the contrast is between the permanent nature of the five aggregates and the impermanent nature of the five material elements (including space).[n.54] [58] T 21 at T I 266c1.

Another difference is that according to the individual Chinese translation, the Tibetan discourse, and the discourse quotation in the Abhidharmakośopāyikā-ṭīkā this type of view is not the outcome of theoretical speculation. Instead, this view was proclaimed by Brahmā. A being in the Brahmā realm heard this view and, after being reborn in the human realm and developing concentration, recollects this proposition made by Brahmā.

In regard to the other three grounds, the different versions are in agreement. The present case of partial eternalism is thus similar to the previous case of eternalism, in that whereas the Pāli and Dīrgha-āgama discourses, as well as the *Śāriputrābhidharma, consider theoretical speculation as one possible ground for the respective view, the other versions relate the arising of all such views to various forms of meditative experience.

The next topic in the analysis of views given in the Dīrgha-āgama treatment revolves around perspectives on the dimensions of the world.[n.55] The translation continues from T I 91a16.

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III. Views Related to the Past – The Dimensions of the World

"There are still other very profound, sublime, and greatly illuminating teachings, for which a noble disciple truly and in an unbiased way praises the Tathāgata. What are these?

"Recluses and brahmins, who have views about the past and ⟨speculations⟩ about the past, propound the doctrine that 'the self and the world are limited' [or else] 'unlimited'. Recluses and brahmins who, because of having views about the past and ⟨speculations⟩ about the past, propound the doctrine that 'the self and the world are limited' [or else] 'unlimited' do not go beyond being among these four views at all.

III.1 "Some recluses and brahmins [by relying] on various means attain a meditative concentration of the mind. Relying on this concentrated mind they contemplate the world and produce a limited perception. They [then] declare: 'This world is limited, this is true and all else is false.' Why is that so? By relying on various means I attained a meditative concentration of the mind. Relying on this concentrated mind, I contemplated the world [and saw that it] is limited. Therefore I know that 'the world is limited, this is true and all else is false.'

"This is reckoned the first view by recluses and brahmins who, because of having views about the past and ⟨speculations⟩ about the past, propound the doctrine that 'the self and the world are limited', not going beyond being among these four views at all.

III.2 "Some recluses and brahmins by relying on various means attain a meditative concentration of the mind. Relying on this concentrated mind they contemplate the world and arouse an unlimited perception. They [then] declare: 'This world is unlimited, this is true and all else is false.' Why is that so? By relying on various means I attained a meditative concentration of the mind. Relying on this concentrated mind, I contemplated the world [and saw that it] is unlimited. Therefore I know that 'the world is unlimited, this is true and all else is false.'

"This is the second view by recluses and brahmins who, because of having views about the past and ⟨speculations⟩ about the past, propound the doctrine that the self and the world are unlimited, not going beyond being among these four views at all.

III.3 "Some recluses and brahmins by relying on various means attain a meditative concentration of the mind. Relying on this concentrated mind they contemplate the world, reckoning that the upward direction is limited, but the four [cardinal] directions are unlimited. They [then] declare: 'The world is limited and unlimited, this is true and all else is false.' Why is that so? By relying on various means I attained a meditative concentration of the mind. Relying on this concentrated mind, I contemplated the world [and saw that] the upward direction is limited, but the four [cardinal] directions are unlimited. Therefore I know that the world is limited and unlimited, this is true and all else is false.'

"This is the third view by recluses and brahmins who, because of having views about the past and ⟨speculations⟩ about the past, propound the doctrine that 'the self and the world are limited and unlimited', not going beyond being among these four views at all.

III.4 "Some recluses and brahmins have swift discriminative knowledge and are skilled at examination. Relying on swift examination and knowledge, relying on their own knowledge and arguments, they proclaim: 'The self and the world are neither limited nor unlimited, this is true and all else is false.'

"This is the fourth view by recluses and brahmins who, because of having views about the past and ⟨speculations⟩ about the past, propound the doctrine that 'the self and the world are [neither] limited [nor] unlimited', [n.56] [59] DĀ 21 at T I 91b17 actually reads 有邊無邊, just as in the previous case, which I take to be an error for 非有邊非無邊, a reading found also in the parallel passage in the *Śāriputrābhidharma, T 1548 at T XXVIII 658a12. not going beyond being among these four views at all.

"These are the recluses and brahmins who have views about the past and ⟨speculations⟩ about the past and who propound the doctrine that 'the self and the world are limited' [or else] 'unlimited', not going beyond being comprised among these four views at all.

"Only the Buddha is able to know the compass of these views, how they are upheld and how they are grasped, and he also knows their result. The Tathāgata's knowledge goes still beyond that and even though he has such knowledge he is not attached to it. Already being without attachment and having attained quiescence, he knows the arising of feelings, their cessation, their gratification, their disadvantage, and the escape from them. By way of this unbiased vision he has been liberated without remainder, for which reason he is called a Tathāgata. This is another very profound, sublime, and greatly illuminating principle, for which a noble disciple truly and in an unbiased way praises the Tathāgata."

The Pāli version agrees closely with the Dīrgha-āgama account on the four ways in which views on the dimensions of the world can arise. The Tibetan versions differ inasmuch as in their presentation the fourth view, according to which the world is limited as well as unlimited, also arises out of a meditative experience.[n.57] [61] Weller 1934: 40,10 and D 4094 ju 148b1 or Q 5595 tu 170b7. T 21 at T I 267a28 only describes the four views and how they conflict with one another, but does not indicate whether these arise out of meditative experience or due to theoretical speculation.

The theme of the dimensions of the world comes up in the standard set of ten unanswered questions.[n.58] [62] Dutt 1932: 710 draws attention to the relationship between these ten questions and the views in the Brahmajāla. For a criticism of his presentation cf. Wijebandara 1993: 90. As discussed in the previous chapter, the rationale behind setting aside such questions appears to be their mistaken premises.[n.59] Cf. above p. 106. Instead of affirming or rejecting any of these proposals on the dimensions of the world, the Brahmajāla analysis reveals how particular subjective experiences lead to a conception of the world in a corresponding way.

The next theme taken up in the Dīrgha-āgama treatment is equivocation.[n.60] The translation continues from T I 91b25.

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IV. Views Related to the Past – Equivocation

"There are still other very profound, sublime, and greatly illuminating teachings, for which a noble disciple truly and in an unbiased way praises the Tathāgata. What are these?

"Recluses and brahmins, who have views about the past and ⟨speculations⟩ about the past, on being asked in one way will answer in another way; at the time of being asked this or that, on being asked in one way they will answer in another way, not going beyond being among these four views at all. Recluses and brahmins, because of having these views about the past and ⟨speculations⟩ about the past, on being asked in one way they answer in another way, not going beyond being among these four views at all.

IV.1 "Some recluses and brahmins put forth this doctrine, put forth this view: I do not see and do not know: 'Is there retribution for good and evil,[n.61] [64] Adopting a variant that adds 耶善惡, in accordance with the reading found elsewhere in this type of statement. or is there no retribution for good and evil?' Because I do not see or know, I state [in a questioning manner without committing myself]: 'Is there retribution for good and evil? Is there no retribution for it?' In the world there are recluses and brahmins who are widely learned, clever, and wise, who always enjoy seclusion,[n.62] [65] DĀ 21 at T I 91c5: 常樂閑靜 (Hirakawa 1997: 1199 indicates that 閑靜 can render praviveka or rahas). As already noted by Weller 1971: 240 note 177, this expression does not fit the context. A reference to enjoying seclusion would be more appropriate for describing those given to a life of meditation in solitude instead of clever debaters, whom one would expect to rather delight in meetings in public in order to be able to exercise their skills. Notably, the same qualification of the debaters is also found in the *Śāriputrābhidharma, T 1548 at T XXVIII 658a28: 常樂閑靜. This recurrence of the same inappropriate qualification supports the hypothesis that the *Śāriputrābhidharma and the Dīrgha-āgama were transmitted by reciters of the same school. At the same time, minor variations between the two versions (cf., e.g., the note just below) show that they are not just identical. being able and skilled debaters, esteemed in the world, who are able to use their wisdom skilfully to tear apart any view. Suppose these should ask me about profound matters and I should not be able to answer them, that would be embarrassing. Out of such fear of others, I shall use this [evasive mode of] reply as a refuge, an island, a shelter, and a supreme resort. On being asked by them, I shall answer like this: 'This matter is like this, this matter is true, this matter is otherwise, this matter is not otherwise, this matter is neither otherwise nor not otherwise.'

"This is the first view by recluses and brahmins who, because of being asked in one way will answer in another way, not going beyond being among these four views at all.

IV.2 "Some recluses and brahmins put forth this doctrine, put forth this view: I do not see and do not know: 'Is there another world or is there no other world?' In the world there are recluses and brahmins who by relying on the divine eye know, who have knowledge of the mind of others, being able to see matters far away that others cannot see even though they are already close to it.[n.63] [66] The parallel passage in T 1548 at T XXVIII 658b8 conveys a different sense, in that those others can see one even from far away, whereas oneself cannot see them even from close by, 在遠處能見我, 我若近猶不能見. Such people are able to know if there is another world or if there is no other world. I do not know and do not see if there is another world or if there is no other world. If I were to declare it, that would be a falsehood. Because I am averse to and afraid of falsehood, I shall use this to become a refuge, an island, a shelter, and a supreme resort. On being asked by them, I shall answer like this: 'This matter is like this, this matter is true, this matter is otherwise, this matter is not otherwise, this matter is neither otherwise nor not otherwise.'

"This is the second view by recluses and brahmins who, because of being asked in one way will answer in another way, not going beyond being among these four views at all.

IV.3 "Some recluses and brahmins put forth this view, put forth this doctrine: I do not see and do not know: 'What is wholesome? What is unwholesome?' Not knowing and not seeing it like this, [if] I were to declare: 'This is wholesome! This is unwholesome!', this would lead to the arising of craving in me. From craving arises aversion. There being craving and aversion, there is the arising of grasping.[n.64] [67] DĀ 21 at T I 91c26: 受, which can render upādāna as well as vedanā (cf. Hirakawa 1997: 228). Elsewhere in the present discourse, 受 renders vedanā, yet in the present context I assume that 受 functions as an equivalent to 取, upādāna, as suggested in a gloss in the 佛光 edition of DĀ 21, p. 547 note 1. I wish to eradicate grasping, for which reason I left the household life to practise. Because of that aversion and fear of grasping, I shall use this to become a refuge, an island, a shelter, and a supreme resort. On being asked by them, I shall answer like this: 'This matter is like this, this matter is true, this matter is otherwise, this matter is not otherwise, this matter is neither otherwise nor not otherwise.'

"This is the third view by recluses and brahmins who, because of being asked in one way will answer in another way, not going beyond being among these four views at all.

IV.4 "Some recluses and brahmins are dull and blinded by foolishness. On being asked by others, they consequently reply to them: '[As to] this matter like this, this matter is true, this matter is otherwise, this matter is not otherwise, this matter is neither otherwise nor not otherwise.'

"This is the fourth view by recluses and brahmins who, because of being asked in one way will answer in another way, not going beyond being among these four views at all.

"Some recluses and brahmins, who have views about the past and ⟨speculations⟩ about the past and who, on being asked in one way will answer in another way, all do not go beyond being comprised among these four views at all.

"Only the Buddha is able to know the compass of these views, how they are upheld and how they are grasped, and he also knows their result. The Tathāgata's knowledge goes still beyond that and even though he has such knowledge he is not attached to it. Being already without attachment and having attained quiescence, he knows the arising of feelings, their cessation, their gratification, their disadvantage, and the escape from them. By way of this unbiased vision he has been liberated without remainder, for which reason he is called a Tathāgata. This is another very profound, sublime, and greatly illuminating principle, for which a noble disciple truly and in an unbiased way praises the Tathāgata."

The first three grounds for equivocation manifest with a considerable degree of variety in the different versions of the Brahmajāla. In the Dīrgha-āgama account and the *Śāriputrābhidharma, the respective recluse or brahmin in each of these three cases lacks a different type of knowledge and adopts equivocation out of a different type of motivation. In the first case the recluse or brahmin is uncertain about retribution for good and evil and avoids taking a position out of fear of being embarrassed in debate. In the second case he is uncertain about the existence of another world and fears falsehood, and in the third case he is uncertain about the nature of what is wholesome and what is unwholesome and refrains from any statement out of apprehension that this would become a manifestation of craving and aversion.

In the Pāli account, the first three cases share the same lack of knowledge, which is about the nature of what is wholesome and what is unwholesome. In the first case the recluse or brahmin resorts to equivocation out of fear of falsehood, in the second case out of fear of attachment, and in the third case in order to avoid being worsted in debate. The Tibetan versions agree with the Pāli discourse in presenting the nature of wholesomeness and unwholesomeness as the uniting theme of the first three cases. The rationale for avoiding a definite stance on this matter is, according to them, fear of falsehood, fear of wrong views, and fear of falling prey to ignorance; a presentation that is also reflected in Sanskrit fragments.[n.65] [68] Weller 1934: 42,32: brdzun du smra bas ’jigs pa (he actually reads brdsun); 44,12: log par lta bas ’jigs pa; 44,28: shes bzhin ma yin pas ’jigs pa (the last would literally be fear of lack of alertness, but Weller 1935: 53 note 303 suggests that in the present context shes bzhin could reflect jñāna in the Indic original, based on which he renders shes bzhin ma yin pa as "ignorance", an interpretation confirmed by the quote in Śamathadeva and the Sanskrit fragment). D 4094 ju 149a1 or Q 5595 tu 171b1: rdzun (D: brdzun) du smra bas ’jigs shing, D 4094 ju 149a5 or Q 5595 tu 171b5: log par lta bas ’jigs par, D 4094 ju 149b1 or Q 5595 tu 172a2: mi shes pas ’jigs shing. Fragment Hoernle 168/168a V6, Hartmann 1989: 48, reads: (mṛṣāvā)dabhayabh[ītaḥ mṛṣ](āvādam eva pa)[riju](gupsamānas); ibid. R6: (mityādṛ)[ṣ]ṭ(i)m [e]va parijugupsamānas; and SHT III 803 V4, Waldschmidt et al. 1971: 5, reads: saṃmoham-eva parijugupsamānas.

The individual Chinese translation offers yet another perspective. Its first case takes up the existence of another world, in regard to which a definite stance is avoided out of fear of a bad rebirth that might ensue from holding a wrong view when confronted with other debaters.[n.66] [69] T 21 at T I 267c15: 死墮惡道. This is unexpected, since one would not expect fear of a bad rebirth to be a prominent motivation among those who are uncertain about the existence of other worlds. The next case is retribution for good and evil. Here the problem of attachment prevents making a pronouncement, together with fear of being interrogated. [n.67] [70] T 21 at T I 267c19: 為著 and T I 267c23: 疑恐畏來問. In the third case the nature of wholesomeness is the theme, and a position on such matters is avoided out of fear of falling into an evil path and in order to avoid being criticized.[n.68] [71] T 21 at T I 268a6: 恐畏惡道, 若有問事者便共諍.

Regarding the fourth case, however, the Pāli and Chinese versions agree that here equivocation is just due to foolishness. Whereas the Dīrgha-āgama account, the individual Chinese translation, and the *Śāriputrābhidharma do not specify the matter on which questions are asked in the fourth case, according to the Pāli version such questions could be on the existence of another world, on spontaneously arisen beings, on retribution for good and evil, and on the destiny of a Tathāgata after death.[n.69] [72] DN 1 at DN I 27,11.

According to the Tibetan versions, the topic of enquiry is the existence and nature of another world and an answer is avoided out of fear of foolishness.[n.70] [73] Weller 1934: 46,13 gti mug gis ’jigs pa and D 4094 ju 149b5 or Q 5595 tu 172a8: rmongs pas ’jigs shing. Thus, according to them, it is not the foolishness itself that underlies the equivocation, but rather the wish to avoid being shown up as a fool.

In relation to the earlier instances of equivocation, it is noteworthy that in the third case in the Dīrgha-āgama the recluse or brahmin does not know what is wholesome and what is unwholesome, yet he refrains from taking a position out of fear of craving and aversion and in order not to succumb to grasping. A similar contrast obtains in relation to the second and third cases in the Pāli version, where the respective recluse and brahmin also does not know what is wholesome and what is unwholesome, yet he refrains from taking a position out of fear of falsehood or out of fear of attachment.[n.71] [74] DN 1 at DN I 25,9 and DN I 26,1.

Clearly, these recluses and brahmins cannot be totally ignorant of the nature of wholesomeness or unwholesomeness, otherwise they would not see a problem with speaking falsehood or with attachment.[n.72] [75] Wijebandara 1993: 71 comments (in relation to the first case in DN 1) that "he definitely knows that to tell falsehood is bad … thus what is apparent is that he has some moral standards to abide by."

Of interest here is also an explanation given in the Pāli commentary of the way the equivocation is expressed. According to the Pāli discourse, the equivocation runs: "I do not say it is like this. I do not say it is like that. I do not say it is otherwise. I do not say it is not. I do not say it is not not."[n.73] [76] DN 1 at DN I 25,12: evam pi me no, tathā ti pi me no, aññathā ti pi me no, no ti pi me no, no no ti pi me no. What at first may appear satirical,[n.74] [77] Basham 1951: 17 suggests that this description, in the case of Sañjaya Belaṭṭhiputta, "is probably satirical, a tilt at agnostic teachers who were unwilling to give a definite answer to any metaphysical question put to them"; for critical remarks on Basham's presentation cf. Jayatilleke 1963/1980: 132. according to the commentarial explanation could be seen as a systematic refusal of the different possible propositions that underlie the unanswered questions.[n.75] [78] Sv I 116,1: tathā ti pi me no ti … sassatavādaṃ paṭikkhipati, aññathā ti pi me no ti … ekaccasassataṃ paṭikkhipati, no ti pi me no ti … ucchedaṃ paṭikkhipati, no no ti pi me no ti n' eva hoti na na hotī ti … paṭikkhipati (this is followed by an alternative explanation according to which these answers are simply modes of equivocation). For an examination of these two explanations and an alternative third model that also relates the five aspects of the equivocator's statement to these four views see Jayatilleke 1963/1980: 135–138. This systematic refusal begins with a general expression of disagreement: "I do not say it is like this." Then the doctrine of eternalism is refused: "I do not say it is like that." Next comes a rebuttal of partial eternalism: "I do not say it is otherwise." Annihilationism is also rejected: "I do not say it is not." The final proposal "I do not say it is not not" then covers the fourth logical alternative, which predicates neither existence nor non-existence after death. Viewed from this perspective, the equivocator is putting up a detailed refusal of those questions the Buddha also was not willing to answer.[n.76] [79] Collins 1982: 128 remarks that "the 'eel-wrigglers' … [their] lack of positive assertion has a verbal resemblance to the Buddha's own [lack of positive assertion] in certain other contexts."

The type of reply adopted by the equivocators recurs in the Pāli version of the Sāmaññāphala-sutta's account of the view of Sañjaya Belaṭṭhiputta, which, however, uses the entire set of replies for each of the four logical alternatives.[n.77] [80] DN 2 at DN I 58,26. The parallels to the Sāmaññāphala-sutta show considerable variations in regard to which view should be attributed to which of the six teachers.[n.78] [81] For a comparative study of the different versions cf. Bapat 1948, Mac- Queen 1988, and Meisig 1987a. Whereas the Dīrgha-āgama version agrees with the Pāli account that Sañjaya was an equivocator, according to an individual Chinese translation equivocation was instead practised by Ajita Kesakambalī, and the Saṅghabhedavastu associates equivocation with Pakudha Kaccāyana.[n.79] [82] DĀ 27 at T I 108c21, T 22 at T I 271c16, and Gnoli 1978: 226,20.

The next theme broached in the Dīrgha-āgama treatment is fortuitous origination.[n.80] The translation continues from T I 92a13.

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V. Views Related to the Past – Fortuitous Origination

"There are still other very profound, sublime, and greatly illuminating teachings, for which a noble disciple truly and in an unbiased way praises the Tathāgata. What are these?

"Some recluses and brahmins, who have views about the past and ⟨speculations⟩ about the past, reckon that this world has come into existence without a cause, which are all comprised among two views. These views about the past and ⟨speculations⟩ about the past, [reckoning] that the world has come into existence without a cause, do not go beyond being among these two views at all.

"Because of what matter do recluses and brahmins, who have views about the past and ⟨speculations⟩ about the past, reckon that existence is without a cause, not going beyond being among these two views at all?

V.1 "Some living beings are devoid of perception and knowing. If such a living being gives rise to a perception, his life will in turn come to an end. [One of them] comes to be reborn in the human world and, having come of age, having shaved off his hair and beard, donned the three robes, and left the household life to practise the path, he attains a meditative concentration of the mind. Relying on this concentration of the mind, he recollects his past birth and declares: 'Having formerly not existed, I have now come into existence spontaneously. This world formerly did not exist and has now come into existence, this is true and all else is false.'

"This is the first view by recluses and brahmins who, because of having views of the past and ⟨speculations⟩ about the past, reckon that there is no cause for existence, not going beyond being among these two views at all.[n.81] [83] Adopting the variant 見 instead of 際, in accordance with the reading found elsewhere in this type of statement.

V.2 "Some recluses and brahmins have swift discriminative knowledge and are skilled at examination. Having used swift examination and knowledgeable observation, relying on their own knowledge, arguments, and abilities, they declare like this: 'This world has come into existence without a cause, this is true and all else is false.'

"This is the second view by recluses and brahmins who, because of having views about the past and ⟨speculations⟩ about the past, [reckon] that there is no cause for existence, for the existence of this world, not going beyond being among these two views at all.

Recluses and brahmins, who have views about the past and ⟨speculations⟩ about the past, that there is no cause for existence, do not go beyond being comprised among these two views at all. Only the Buddha is able to know … [the rest is] also [to be recited] further like this.

"Recluses and brahmins who have views about the past and ⟨speculations⟩ about the past, diverse and innumerable, declared in accordance with their mental dispositions, are all comprised among these eighteen views. These views about the past and ⟨speculations⟩ about the past, diverse and innumerable, declared in accordance with mental dispositions, do not go beyond being among these eighteen views at all. Only the Buddha is able to know … [the rest is] also [to be recited] further like this."

In regard to the two modes that lead to views of fortuitous origination, all versions agree that they arise owing to a former life in an unconscious realm or out of intellectual speculation.[n.82] [85] T 21 at T I 267a12 does not describe such intellectual speculation in the way this is done in the other versions, but again refers to what appears to be confused thinking, 意念癡. A difference can be found in regard to the placing of this passage in the overall treatment, as the individual Chinese translation and the Tibetan versions turn to fortuitous origination already after having examined partially eternalist views,[n.83] [86] This sequence is also reflected in fragment Hoernle 149/262, Hartmann 1991: 82 (§14). and follow fortuitous origination with the dimensions of the world and equivocation. By in this way placing equivocation at the end of the exposition of views related to the past, and thus at the point of transition from views related to the past to views related to the future, the sequence in these versions indirectly highlights that equivocation does not fit the heading of being related to the "past" particularly well.

In general, the point in grouping these various topics under the heading of being related to the past seems to be related to the ground, vatthu, in question.[n.84] Wynne 2010/2011: 144 notes that the "presentation of views according to their temporal significance … is fundamental to the text's analysis." In the case of the first set of four eternalist views, for example, to associate these with the past would not imply that such views affirm eternal existence only for the past. Once the status of eternal existence is granted, it would automatically follow that what was eternal in the past will also be eternal in the future.[n.85] [87] Seidenstücker 1913: 117 remarks that "wer die Frage nach der Ewigkeit von Selbst und Welt einmal aufwirft, wird nicht nur den Anfang, sondern auch das Ende der Dinge in den Kreis seiner Betrachtungen ziehen." The point rather seems to be that what has led to the arising of these views is related to the past. In the case of eternalism, the most prominent cause is recollection of past lives, which quite evidently is related to the past.

Recollections of past experiences are also a prominent theme in regard to other types of views taken up under the heading of being related to the past. Thus the first three semi-eternalist views are due to recollecting a former life in a heavenly realm. One cause for developing a view of fortuitous origination is also related to such recollection, which in this case only extends up to a former life in an unconscious realm. Hence, even though the label "past" may not fit all of the items listed, it does account for a fair number of grounds for views treated in this section. One might even extend this to conclusions about the dimensions of the world, which are based on some past meditative experience.

But in the case of equivocation an association with the past does not seem to be feasible, in fact the adoption of equivocation is in several instances due to an apprehension of something to come in the future, such as being confronted with other debaters or falling prey to the arising of attachment.

Having concluded its survey of views that have been assembled under the heading of being related to the past, the Brahmajāla analysis in the Dīrgha-āgama turns to the future. The first main topic under this heading is the survival of a self. Views on such survival come in three main categories, namely a sixteenfold set of propositions on a percipient self, followed by two eightfold sets of propositions on an impercipient self and on a self that is neither-percipient-nor-impercipient. In what follows, I will cover these three main categories together.[n.86] The translation continues from T I 92b7.

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VI to VIII. Views Related to the Future – Survival of a Self

"There are still other very profound, sublime, and greatly illuminating teachings. What are these?

"Recluses and brahmins who have views about the future and ⟨speculations⟩ about the future, diverse and innumerable, declared in accordance with their mental dispositions, are all comprised among forty-four views. These views about the future and ⟨speculations⟩ about the future, diverse and innumerable, declared in accordance with mental dispositions, do not go beyond [being among] these forty-four views at all.

"Because of what matter do recluses and brahmins have views about the future and ⟨speculations⟩ about the future, diverse and innumerable, declared in accordance with their mental dispositions, not going beyond [being among] these forty-four views at all?

"Recluses and brahmins, who have views about the future and ⟨speculations⟩ about the future, give rise to a doctrine of percipiency, declaring that the world is percipient, all being comprised among sixteen views. These views about the future and ⟨speculations⟩ about the future, giving rise to doctrines of percipiency, declaring that the world is percipient, do not go beyond being among these sixteen views at all.

"Because of what matter do recluses and brahmins, who have views about the future and ⟨speculations⟩ about the future, give rise to a doctrine of percipiency, declaring that the world is percipient, not going beyond being comprised among these sixteen views at all?

VI.1 "Recluses and brahmins put forth this doctrine, put forth this view, declaring: 'After the end of this, I will be reborn percipient and be material,[n.87] [88] In relation to the various propositions about a surviving self, the Pāli version qualifies each as aroga, "unimpaired" (e.g. DN 1 at DN I 31,6); cf. also Skilling 1997: 480. Although this qualification is not found in the other versions, Schrader 1902: 9 note 2 draws attention to a similar qualification used in Jain texts (he refers to Sūtrakṛtāṅga I,1,3,15): siddhā ya te arogā ya. this is true and all else is false.' This is the first view.

"Recluses and brahmins, because of having views about the future and ⟨speculations⟩ about the future, give rise to a doctrine of percipiency and declare that the world is percipient, not going beyond being among these sixteen views at all.

VI.2 "Some declare: 'After the end of this, I will be reborn percipient and be immaterial, this is true and all else is false.'

VI.3 "Some declare: 'After the end of this, I will be reborn percipient and be material as well as immaterial, this is true and all else is false.'

VI.4 "Some declare: 'After the end of this, I will be reborn percipient and be neither material nor immaterial, this is true and all else is false.'

VI.5 "Some declare: 'After the end of this, I will be reborn percipient and be limited, this is true and all else is false.'

VI.6 "Some declare: 'After the end of this, I will be reborn percipient and be unlimited, this is true and all else is false.'

VI.7 "Some declare: 'After the end of this, I will be reborn percipient and be limited as well as unlimited, this is true and all else is false.'

VI.8 "Some declare: 'After the end of this, I will be reborn percipient and be neither limited nor unlimited, this is true and all else is false.'

VI.9 "Some declare: 'After the end of this, I will be reborn percipient and experience only happiness, this is true and all else is false.'

VI.10 "Some declare: 'After the end of this, I will be reborn percipient and experience only pain, this is true and all else is false.'

VI.11 "Some declare: 'After the end of this, I will be reborn percipient and experience happiness as well as pain, this is true and all else is false.'

VI.12 "Some declare: 'After the end of this, I will be reborn percipient and experience neither happiness nor pain, this is true and all else is false.'

VI.13 "Some declare: 'After the end of this, I will be reborn with a single perception, this is true and all else is false.'

VI.14 "Some declare: 'After the end of this, I will be reborn with multiple perceptions, this is true and all else is false.'

VI.15 "Some declare: 'After the end of this, I will be reborn with a narrow perception, this is true and all else is false.'

VI.16 "Some declare: 'After the end of this, I will be reborn with a boundless perception, this is true and all else is false.' This is the sixteenth view.

"Recluses and brahmins, who have views about the future and ⟨speculations⟩ about the future, give rise to a doctrine of percipiency, declaring that the world is percipient, not going beyond being among these sixteen views at all. Only the Buddha is able to know … [the rest is] also [to be recited] further like this.

"There are still other very profound, sublime, and greatly illuminating teachings. What are these teachings?

"Recluses and brahmins, who have views about the future and ⟨speculations⟩ about the future, give rise to a doctrine of impercipience, declaring that the world is impercipient, all being comprised among eight views. These views about the future and ⟨speculations⟩ about the future, giving rise to doctrines of impercipience, do not go beyond being among these eight views at all.

"Because of what matter do recluses and brahmins, who have views about the future and ⟨speculations⟩ about the future, give rise to a doctrine of impercipience, declaring that the world is impercipient, not going beyond being among these eight views at all?

VII.1 "Recluses and brahmins put forth this view, put forth this doctrine: 'After the end of this, I will be reborn impercipient and be material, this is true and all else is false.'

VII.2 "Some declare: 'After the end of this, I will be reborn impercipient and be immaterial, this is true and all else is false.'

VII.3 "Some declare: 'After the end of this, I will be reborn impercipient and be material as well as immaterial, this is true and all else is false.'

VII.4 "Some declare: 'After the end of this, I will be reborn impercipient and be neither material nor immaterial, this is true and all else is false.'

VII.5 "Some declare: 'After the end of this, I will be reborn impercipient and be limited, this is true and all else is false.'

VII.6 "Some declare: 'After the end of this, I will be reborn impercipient and be unlimited, this is true and all else is false.'

VII.7 "Some declare: 'After the end of this, I will be reborn impercipient and be limited as well as unlimited, this is true and all else is false.'

VII.8 "Some declare: 'After the end of this, I will be reborn impercipient and be neither limited nor unlimited, this is true and all else is false.' These are the eight views.

"Recluses and brahmins who, because of having views about the future and ⟨speculations⟩ about the future, give rise to a doctrine of impercipience, declaring that the world is impercipient, do not go beyond being comprised among these eight views at all. Only the Buddha is able to know … [the rest is] also [to be recited] further like this.

"There are still other very profound, sublime, and greatly illuminating teachings. What are these teachings?

"Recluses and brahmins, who have views about the future and ⟨speculations⟩ about the future, give rise to a doctrine of neither-percipience-nor-impercipience, declaring that the world is neither-percipient-nor-impercipient, all being comprised among eight views. These views about the future and ⟨speculations⟩ about the future, putting forth the doctrine of neither-percipience-nor-impercipience and declaring the world to be neither-percipient-nor-impercipient, do not go beyond being among these eight views at all.

"Because of what matter do recluses and brahmins, who have views about the future and ⟨speculations⟩ about the future, give rise to a doctrine of neither-percipience-nor-impercipience, declaring that the world is neither-percipient-nor-impercipient, not going beyond being among these eight views at all?

VIII.1 "Recluses and brahmins put forth this doctrine, put forth this view: 'After the end of this, I will be reborn neitherpercipient-nor-impercipient and be material, this is true and all else is false.'

VIII.2 "Some declare: 'After the end of this, I will be reborn neither-percipient-nor-impercipient and be immaterial, this is true and all else is false.'

VIII.3 "Some declare: 'After the end of this, I will be reborn neither-percipient-nor-impercipient and be material as well as immaterial, this is true and all else is false.'

VIII.4 "Some declare: 'After the end of this, I will be reborn neither-percipient-nor-impercipient and be neither material nor immaterial, this is true and all else is false.'

VIII.5 "Some declare: 'After the end of this, I will be reborn neither-percipient-nor-impercipient and be limited, this is true and all else is false.'

VIII.6 "Some declare: 'After the end of this, I will be reborn neither-percipient-nor-impercipient and be unlimited, this is true and all else is false.'

VIII.7 "Some declare: 'After the end of this, I will be reborn neither-percipient-nor-impercipient and be limited as well as unlimited, this is true and all else is false.'

VIII.8 "Some declare: 'After the end of this, I will be reborn neither-percipient-nor-impercipient and be neither limited nor unlimited, this is true and all else is false.' These are the eight views.

"If recluses and brahmins, because of having views about the future and ⟨speculations⟩ about the future, give rise to a doctrine of neither-percipience-nor-impercipience, declaring that the world is neither-percipient-nor-impercipient, they do not go beyond being comprised among these eight views at all. Only the Buddha is able to know … [the rest is] also [to be recited] further like this."

Regarding the sixteen ways of arriving at a view about a percipient self that survives after death, apart from some variations in sequence the different versions are in close agreement.[n.88] [89] A noteworthy difference occurs in the *Śāriputrābhidharma, which differs in so far as it presents these views as declarations made about oneself in this life, adding that one will not exist after death, e.g., in the first case T 1548 at T XXVIII 659a16: 色是我想是世, 命終已我不復有. Since this does not fit the context, I take this to be a transmission or translation error.

The eight grounds for proclaiming the survival of an impercipient self are the same in the different versions, as is the case for the eight grounds for proclaiming the survival of a self that is neither-percipient-nor-impercipient.[n.89] [92] A minor variation occurs in T 21 at T I 269a9+11, which treats the case of a neither-percipient-nor-impercipient self being material as well as immaterial twice, 有色無色, where the first instance appears to be an error for the otherwise missing immaterial self.

A complementary perspective on views that proclaim the survival of a self can be gained by consulting the Pañcattaya-sutta and its Tibetan parallel, which similarly treat this topic under the three main categories of a percipient self, an impercipient self, and a neither-percipient-nor-impercipient self.[n.90] On the significance of this discourse cf. also the discussion in Skilling 2017.

Unlike the Brahmajāla treatments, the Pāli version of the Pañcattaya-sutta distinguishes only eight modes of the percipient self. These result from applying the fourfold treatment to the materiality of such a self, and to the nature of its perceptions, envisaging it to be single or multiple etc.[n.91] [93] MN 102 at MN II 229,1. The theme of a self that is limited (or otherwise) and a self that is entirely happy (or otherwise) comes up in MN 102 at MN II 233,19 under the heading of views related to the past. This stands in contrast to the agreement between the different versions of the Brahmajāla and to the Tibetan parallel to MN 102 in Skilling 1994: 348,3, which does not list any of these views in its treatment of the past. MN 102 at MN II 233,25 also includes the single or multiple and the narrow or boundless self in its treatment of the past, even though these have been taken up in its earlier presentation at MN II 229,8 under the heading of being related to the future (with a small difference in formulation inasmuch as in the former case the self and the world are mentioned). This suggests that some error in transmission has occurred and that perhaps the limited self and the happy self originally were part of the exposition of views related to the future. The Tibetan counterpart to the Pañcattaya-sutta covers only six out of these eight possibilities, as it does not mention a self that is material-and-immaterial or a self that is neither-material-nor-immaterial.[n.92] [94] The Tibetan version in Skilling 1994: 314,12 takes up only gzugs can and gzugs can ma yin pa, after which it turns to single, multiple, narrow, and boundless types of a percipient self, to which it also adds a self that has become great, ibid. 314,17: ’du shes chen por gyur pa (which, as Skilling 1997: 484 notes, in Sanskrit would be mahadgatasaṃjñī).

When it comes to the impercipient self, the Pañcattaya-sutta and its Tibetan parallel are even briefer. Whereas the Pāli version of the Pañcattaya-sutta lists four modes of such a self, which are the four possibilities in regard to the materiality of such a self, the Tibetan version lists only a single instance of this self, which is simply the proposition that the surviving self is impercipient.[n.93] [95] MN 102 at MN II 230,7 and Skilling 1994: 318,12. In the case of a self that is neither-percipient-nor-impercipient, the Pāli version of the Pañcattaya-sutta again covers the four possibilities related to its materiality, whereas its Tibetan counterpart just lists the single view as such.[n.94] [96] MN 102 at MN II 231,3 and Skilling 1994: 324,6.

It is noteworthy that, whereas the different versions of the Brahmajāla agree closely with one another, the Pañcattaya-sutta and its parallel offer such different perspectives on the same topic. These different perspectives show that to analyse views related to the survival of a self can be executed in different manners.

The same can also be seen in a discourse in the Udāna, which places fortuitous origination within a scheme of views related to the happiness and pain experienced by the self and the world, proposing that these are self-created, or created by another, or by both, or by neither.[n.95] [97] Ud 6.5 at Ud 70,4: sayaṃkataṃ sukhadukkhaṃ attā ca loko ca … paraṃkataṃ sukhadukkhaṃ … sayaṃkatañ ca paraṃkatañ ca sukhadukkhaṃ … asayaṃkāraṃ aparaṃkāraṃ adhiccasamuppannaṃ sukhadukkhaṃ attā ca loko ca.

This perspective is intriguing in so far as it invites combining the different grounds for views treated in the Brahmajāla. Understood in this way, the present treatment on views about a surviving self can be seen as providing a basic matrix that could be interrelated or combined with other positions in various ways.[n.96] [98] Bodhi 1978/1992: 28 comments that "these views are not mutually exclusive, but simply provide a selection of conceptions of the surviving self which can be combined to form any complete theory. Thus the self might be conceived to be immaterial, finite, of uniform perception and exclusively happy after death etc." This pattern builds on the three main modes of percipience, impercipience, and a combination of both, and then explores the different axes possible in each case. In the case of percipience these are four, namely the materiality of such a self, its limited nature, the nature of its perceptions, and the nature of its feelings. Each of these is treated comprehensively according to the scheme of the fourfold logic. In the other two cases of impercipience and of neither-percipience-nor-impercipience the question of the nature of perception and feelings does not come in, hence these two cases are only taken up from two angles, that of the materiality of such a self and of its limited nature.

Notably, whereas the fourfold logic dominates the details of this presentation, it is not applied to the basic distinction about the percipience or otherwise of the self, since the possibility of a self that is percipient as well as impercipient is not mentioned at all.

Out of the overall analysis of a surviving self in the Brahmajāla, a few single instances make an appearance also elsewhere among the discourses. The fourfold proposition about the material nature of a self after death and about its happy or painful condition recurs in a set of discourses in the Saṃyutta-nikāya and their counterpart in the Saṃyukta-āgama, which agree on pointing out that such views arise because of grasping at the five aggregates.[n.97] [99] SN 24.37–44 at SN III 219,1 and SĀ 166 at T II 45a17 (to be supplemented from T II 42c20), which also includes the remaining eight positions on a self's survival (i.e., limited, etc., and single perception, etc.).

The proposition of a self that is entirely happy after death comes up for discussion in the Poṭṭhapāda-sutta and its Dīrgha-āgama parallel.[n.98] [100] DN 9 at DN I 192,14: ekantasukhī attā hoti arogo paraṃ maraṇā, a proposal which according to DĀ 28 at T I 111c2 was about the entirely happy nature of the world, 一處世間一向樂. Both versions clarify that such a proposal is meaningless, given that it was not made based on personal experience.

The same topic comes up again in the Cūḷasakuludāyi-sutta and its Madhyama-āgama parallel, where the point under discussion is an entirely happy world and the path that leads to such a world.[n.99] [101] MN 79 at MN II 35,27 and MĀ 208 at T I 785b29. According to both versions, there is indeed such a world and the path to it can be found in the development of absorption.

The Pāli commentary on the views envisaging the survival of the self in the Brahmajāla considers most of these to be the outcome of meditation experiences.[n.100] [102] Sv I 119,5. The powerful influence of experiences derived from meditation practice indeed forms a continuous theme throughout the Brahmajāla analysis, underpinning views related to the future as much as to views related to the past. This highlights that speculative views are not necessarily seen as being the outcome of excessive theorizing instead of practice, but as possibly resulting from misinterpretations of meditative experiences.[n.101] [103] Bodhi 1997: 55f comments that "it is sometimes assumed that the Buddha rejects speculative views simply because these views are distractions from the practice of meditation. Being fabrications of the intellect … it is held, views keep the individual tied to the level of intellectualisation and produce a complacency that obstructs the single-minded commitment to meditation practice." Yet, as the Brahmajāla exposition reveals, "speculative views sometimes arise at the end of a long course of meditative development", which goes to show that "speculative views spring from a root more deeply grounded in the human mind than the disposition to theorisation." Judging from the exposition given in the Brahmajāla, this applies in particular to experiences related to deeper stages of concentration or mental tranquillity.

The problem of drawing one-sided conclusions is neatly illustrated in the famous simile of the blind men and the elephant in the Udāna, a simile also found in a discourse in the Dīrgha-āgama.[n.102] [104] Ud 6.4 at Ud 68,3 and DĀ 30 at T I 128c11; cf. also T 23 at T I 289c17, T 152 at T III 50c24, T 198 at T IV 178b6, T 768 at T XVII 704c7, and T 1592 at T XXXI 98c16. A reference to this simile occurs also in the Vimuttimagga, T 1648 at T XXXII 448a10. Each of the blind men had touched part of an elephant. When asked about the nature of an elephant, each of them was able to rely on direct personal experience. Nevertheless, what each blind man had experienced was only a part of the whole, since one had touched a foot of the elephant, another the trunk or the tail. In spite of drawing on personal experience, the blind men came to radically different conclusions. Their partial direct experiences were not sufficient, since owing to their blindness they lacked the overall vision that would have enabled them to put their partial experiences into perspective.

The next theme broached in the Brahmajāla treatment is annihilation. In this case, too, the experience of meditation takes a prominent role within a set of seven propositions on the annihilation of a self.[n.103] The translation continues from T I 93a19.

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IX. Views Related to the Future – Annihilation

"There are still other very profound, sublime, and greatly illuminating teachings. What are these teachings?

"Recluses and brahmins, who have views about the future and ⟨speculations⟩ about the future, propound a doctrine of annihilation, declaring that living beings are annihilated without remainder, all being comprised among seven views. These views about the future and ⟨speculations⟩ about the future, propounding a doctrine of annihilation, declaring that living beings are annihilated without remainder, do not go beyond being among these seven views at all.

"Because of what matter do recluses and brahmins, who have views about the future and ⟨speculations⟩ about the future, propound a doctrine of annihilation, declare that living beings are annihilated without remainder, not going beyond being among these seven views at all?

IX.1 "Some recluses and brahmins put forth this doctrine, put forth this view: 'This body is the self, with its four elements and six sense-spheres, which has been engendered by father and mother and raised with milk, which in dependence on food has come to growth, and which is to be rubbed, covered, protected, and guarded. It is impermanent and will certainly fall apart, and this is reckoned [how] to become completely annihilated.' This is the first view.

IX.2 "Some recluses and brahmins declare: 'This self does not reach what is reckoned to be annihilation. [When] the self of the heavenly realm of desire is annihilated without remainder, this becomes complete annihilation.' This is the second view.

IX.3 "Some recluses and brahmins declare: 'This is not annihilation. [When] the created body of the form realm, endowed with all faculties, is annihilated without remainder, this is [complete] annihilation.'

IX.4 "Some declare: 'This is not annihilation. [When] the immaterial self of the sphere of [boundless] space is annihilated without remainder, [this is complete annihilation].'[n.104] [105] The supplementation of the phrase "this is complete annihilation" here and below receives support from the parallel passage in T 1548 at T XXVIII 660a29: "this is not called annihilation. [When] the [self of the] immaterial sphere of [boundless] space is annihilated, this is reckoned complete annihilation of the self without remainder", 此不名斷滅, 無色空處斷滅, 齊是謂 我斷滅無餘.

IX.5 "Some declare: 'This is not annihilation. [When] the immaterial self of the sphere of [boundless] consciousness is annihilated without remainder, [this is complete annihilation].'

IX.6 "Some declare: 'This is not annihilation. [When] the immaterial self of the sphere of nothingness is annihilated without remainder, [this is complete annihilation].'

IX.7 "Some declare: 'This is not annihilation. [When] the immaterial self of the sphere of neither-perception-nor-non-perception is annihilated without remainder, [this is complete annihilation].'[n.105] [106] DN 1 at DN I 35,29 introduces the attainment of neither-perception-nor-non-perception as "peaceful and sublime", santam etaṃ paṇītam etaṃ. This is the seventh annihilationist [view].

"These are the seven views. Recluses and brahmins who, because of having views about the future and ⟨speculations⟩ about the future, propound annihilation without remainder of the classes of living beings, do not go beyond being comprised among these seven views at all. Only the Buddha is able to know … [the rest is] also [to be recited] further like this. "

The different versions are in close agreement on the seven modes that lead to annihilationist views. The Pāli version of the Pañcattaya-sutta takes up the same theme in a single manner, without offering any listing of instances of this view, whereas its Tibetan parallel has the same listing of seven modes as found in the parallel versions of the Brahmajāla.[n.106] [107] MN 102 at MN II 232,7 and Skilling 1994: 338,7.

The seven propositions on annihilation offer a remarkable range of possible positions on this topic. Except for the first, which identifies the self with the body and assumes this self to be annihilated with the death of the body, the other propositions could be envisaging annihilation as a goal to be achieved through some kind of practice.[n.107] [108] Bodhi 1978/1992: 30 comments that "it may be that these latter six positions do not regard annihilation as the ineluctable fate of all beings, but as the ultimate destiny and highest good of the spiritually perfected saint." This is particularly evident with the last four instances, which correspond to the four immaterial attainments. Since to experience these immaterial spheres requires a considerable degree of meditative proficiency, an annihilationist view related to the attainment or experience of these states could not reasonably assume that all beings are destined to such annihilation. That is, from the perspective of the upholders of such a view, annihilation would have been considered as a goal to be attained through an appropriate form of conduct and meditation practice. The idea behind such an aspiration for annihilation could be a merger with a form of ultimate reality, held to be equivalent to boundless space, or to boundless consciousness, or to nothingness, or to neither-perception-nor-non-perception. [n.108] [109] Barua 1968: 11 suggests that here the immaterial attainments appear to be "considered as the ultimate means of stopping the course of saṃsāra". Attaining such a merger at the death of the body, any selfhood would be successfully annihilated.

That annihilation was perceived by some contemporaries of the Buddha as a goal to be attained through a particular mode of conduct and practice would also be implicit in the formulation of the aspiration "may I not be, may it not be for me, I shall not be and it will not be for me", which a discourse in the Saṃyutta-nikāya explicitly identifies as an expression of an annihilationist view, ucchedadiṭṭhi. [n.109] [110] SN 22.81 at SN III 99,4: evaṃ diṭṭhi hoti: no c'assaṃ, no ca me siyā, na bhavissāmi, na me bhavissatī ti. yā kho pana sā, bhikkhave, ucchedadiṭṭhi … A discourse in the Aṅguttara-nikāya reckons this aspiration as supreme among heterodox views. [n.110] [111] AN 10.29 at AN V 63,28: etad aggaṃ … bāhirakānaṃ diṭṭhigatānaṃ, yad idaṃ: no c' assaṃ, no ca me siyā, na bhavissāmi, na me bhavissatī ti. Since this formulation clearly involves an aspiration, what it probably refers to is a form of annihilation that requires some effort and practice, such as would indeed be required for attaining the immaterial spheres.

The final theme in the Dīrgha-āgama's Brahmajāla treatment is Nirvāṇa here and now in five modes. The last four of these are also the outcome of effort and practice, as they require the attainment of the four absorptions.[n.111] The translation continues from T I 93b10.

"There are still other very profound, sublime, and greatly illuminating teachings. What are these teachings?

"Recluses and brahmins, who have views about the future and ⟨speculations⟩ about the future, give rise to a doctrine of Nirvāṇa here and now, declaring that living beings [attain] Nirvāṇa here and now, all being comprised among five views. These views about the future and ⟨speculations⟩ about the future, propounding Nirvāṇa here and now, do not go beyond being among these five views at all.

"Because of what matter do recluses and brahmins, who have views about the future and ⟨speculations⟩ about the future, declare that living beings [attain] Nirvāṇa here and now, not going beyond being among these five views at all?

X.1 "Some recluses and brahmins put forth this doctrine, put forth this view, saying: 'I am now endowed with the pleasures of the five senses, this is my attaining of Nirvāṇa here and now.' This is the first view.

X.2 "Again some recluses and brahmins declare: 'This is Nirvāṇa here and now, indeed.[n.112] The *Śāriputrābhidharma differs inasmuch as in each case the earlier proposal is rejected, T 1548 at T XXVIII 660b23: "this is not called Nirvāṇa here and now", 此不名現在涅槃. DN 1 at DN I 36,30, however, agrees with DĀ 21 that the earlier proposal is accepted. [Yet], there is another Nirvāṇa here and now whose subtlety is supreme, which you do not know and only I know. When having left behind sensuality as well as evil and unwholesome states, with [directed] awareness and [sustained] contemplation, with joy and happiness born of seclusion, I attain the first absorption: this is reckoned Nirvāṇa here and now.' This is the second view.

X.3 "Again some recluses and brahmins declare: 'This is Nirvāṇa here and now, indeed. [Yet], there is another Nirvāṇa here and now whose subtlety is supreme, which you do not know and only I know. When having removed [directed] awareness and [sustained] contemplation, with internal joy and unification of the mind, free from [directed] awareness and [sustained] contemplation, with joy and happiness born of concentration, I attain the second absorption: this is reckoned complete Nirvāṇa here and now.' This is the third view.

X.4 "Again some recluses and brahmins declare: 'This is Nirvāṇa here and now, indeed. [Yet], there is another Nirvāṇa here and now whose subtlety is supreme, which you do not know and only I know. When having mindfully discarded and left behind joy, being established in happiness,[n.113] [114] DĀ 21 at T I 93b29 reads: 除念, where the syntax suggests that mindfulness is discarded. This would not make sense in a description of the third absorption, in fact the description continues by referring to the presence of mindfulness, hence I render 除念 here as "mindfully discards". with mindfulness, equanimity, and unification of the mind, knowing by myself bodily happiness as declared by noble ones, I attain the third absorption: this is reckoned complete Nirvāṇa here and now.' This is the fourth view.

X.5 "Again some recluses and brahmins declare: 'This is Nirvāṇa here and now, indeed. [Yet], there is another Nirvāṇa here and now whose subtlety is supreme, which you do not know and only I know. When with the cessation of happiness, with the cessation of pain, earlier having discarded dejection and joy, with neither-pain-nor-happiness, with purity of mindfulness and equanimity, I attain the fourth absorption – this is reckoned supreme Nirvāṇa.' This is the fifth view.

"If recluses and brahmins, who have views about the future and ⟨speculations⟩ about the future, give rise to a doctrine of

Nirvāṇa here and now, they do not go beyond being among these five views at all. Only the Buddha is able to know … [the rest is] also [to be recited] further like this.

"Recluses and brahmins who have views about the future and ⟨speculations⟩ about the future, diverse and innumerable, declared in accordance with their mental dispositions, do not go beyond being among these forty-four views at all. Only the Buddha is able to know the compass of these views … [the rest is] also [to be recited] further like this."

In regard to the five ways of proclaiming Nirvāṇa here and now, the different versions of the Brahmajāla are in close agreement.[n.114] [115] A listing of various types of diṭṭhadhammanibbāna in AN 9.51 at AN IV 454,4, "in a certain sense", pariyāyena, includes also the immaterial attainments. A minor difference in relation to the last four cases is that according to the Pāli version the respective proponent explains why the previous view does not really constitute Nirvāṇa here and now. Thus the identification of sense-pleasure with Nirvāṇa here and now is rejected by the proponent of the first absorption, since sensual pleasures are impermanent and unsatisfactory, wherefore when they disappear sorrow and grief will arise.[n.115] [116] DN 1 at DN I 36,32.

The upholders of the higher absorptions then in turn reproach those who identify a lower absorption as Nirvāṇa here and now by pointing to the grossness of the particular factor which needs to be overcome in order to lead to the next higher absorption in the series.

A noteworthy aspect of these propositions on Nirvāṇa here and now in the Brahmajāla analysis is that in the present context the term Nirvāṇa has evidently positive connotations, as it stands for various conceptions of physical well-being and enjoyment, or for the happiness and tranquillity that can be experienced with deep levels of concentration. [n.116] [117] Bodhi 1978/1992: 31 comments that Nirvāṇa is conceived here "as the assuagement of pain and supreme happiness to be experienced in this present life. The first, which proclaims nibbāna here and now through the enjoyment of all sense pleasures, is the position of the hedonist … the following four positions are held by the attainers of the four jhānas, who mistake the rapture, bliss and peacefulness of their attainments for the supreme good." The same can also be seen in the Māgandiya-sutta and its Madhyama-āgama parallel, where the first of these ways of proclaiming Nirvāṇa here and now makes its appearance. According to this discourse, for the wanderer Māgandiya Nirvāṇa represented happiness of bodily well-being and freedom from affliction.[n.117] [118] MN 75 at MN I 509,11 and MĀ 153 at T I 672b5.

This concludes the survey of views related to the future. The introductory section to the Pañcattaya-sutta and its Tibetan parallel indicates that the five positions – a percipient self, a non-percipient self, a neither-percipient-nor-non-percipient self, annihilation, and Nirvāṇa here and now – can be subsumed under three main categories by speaking of views that propose a self that survives after death, views that propose a self that is annihilated, and views that propose Nirvāṇa here and now.[n.118] [121] MN 102 at MN II 228,23: pañca hutvā tīṇi honti; and its Tibetan counterpart in Skilling 1994: 314,3: lnga po de dag yod na gsum du ’gyur la; cf. also fragment SHT IV 32 folio 1 V6, Sander and Waldschmidt 1980: 109: (paṃca saṃti trī)[ṇ]i bhavanti. That is, these five fall into three different future time periods, namely views concerned with what will happen after death (survival of a self), at death (annihilation of a self), or before death (Nirvāṇa here and now).[n.119] [122] Hecker 1972: 217. The final part of the Brahmajāla treatment then offers a retrospective on the views examined and contrasts these to the aloofness from views of the Tathāgata.[n.120] The translation continues from T I 93c11.

"Recluses and brahmins who have views about the past and ⟨speculations⟩ about the past and have views about the future and ⟨speculations⟩ about the future, diverse and innumerable, declared in accordance with their mental dispositions, are all comprised among these sixty-two views. These views about the past and ⟨speculations⟩ about the past and these views about the future and ⟨speculations⟩ about the future, diverse and innumerable, declared in accordance with mental dispositions, do not go beyond being among these sixty-two views at all. Only the Tathāgata is able to know the compass of these views … [the rest is] also [to be recited] further like this.

"Recluses and brahmins, who have views about the past and ⟨speculations⟩ about the past, give rise to a doctrine of eternalism, declaring that the self and the world are eternal; these recluses and brahmins produce knowledge that is reckoned [as just] another type of faith, another type of desire, another type of learning, another type of condition, another type of intuition, another type of view, another type of concentration, another type of patience, due to which they produce such knowledge. What these make known is reckoned to be on account of feeling … up to … Nirvāṇa here and now … [the rest is] also [to be recited] further like this.[n.121] [123] Adopting the variant 布 instead of 希.

"Recluses and brahmins, who give rise to a doctrine of eternalism and declare that 'the world is eternal', [they do so] conditioned by feeling, which produces craving. Craving having arisen they do not realize by themselves that they are being defiled by attachment through craving and are under the power of craving … up to … Nirvāṇa here and now … [the rest is] also [to be recited] further like this.

"Recluses and brahmins who, having views about the past and ⟨speculations⟩ about the past, give rise to a doctrine of eternalism, declaring that 'the world is eternal', [they do so] conditioned by contact. It is impossible to establish [such a] doctrine without contact … up to … Nirvāṇa here and now … [the rest is] also [to be recited] further like this.

"Recluses and brahmins, who have views about the past and ⟨speculations⟩ about the past and have views about the future and ⟨speculations⟩ about the future, making declarations in accordance with their view, are all comprised among these sixty-two views. Making declarations in accordance with their view, they all depend on and are established among these and do not go beyond them at all.

"It is just like a skilled trainer of fishermen,[n.122] [125] DĀ 21 at T I 93c28: 猶如巧捕魚師; cf. also the similar reading in T 1548 at T XXVIII 661a3: 如捕魚師. Usually in the discourse a reference to a skilled teacher is followed by a reference to his disciple. Such a reference is indeed found in DN 1 at DN I 45,29, T 21 at T I 270c3, fragment Pelliot 1400/19/bleu 35 Vw, Hartmann 1991: 86 (§16), and in the Tibetan versions, Weller 1934: 60,32 and D 4094 ju 152b4 or Q 5595 tu 176a3. who uses a fine-meshed net to completely cover the surface of a small pond. He will know that all the types of aquatic beings in the pond will get caught in the net, they have no way to escape and do not go beyond it at all.

"Recluses and brahmins are also just like that. Views about the past and ⟨speculations⟩ about the past as well as views about the future and ⟨speculations⟩ about the future, these declarations in various ways are all comprised among these sixty-two views and do not go beyond them at all.

"If a monk knows as it really is the arising of the six spheres of contact, their cessation, their gratification, their disadvantage, and the escape from them, this is supreme and leads out of all those views.

"The Tathāgata knows that for himself birth and death have been eradicated. He makes use of this existing body because of his wish to bring happiness and deliverance to devas and human beings. If there were not that body, devas and men in the world would have nothing to rely on. It is just like a Palmyra tree whose top part has been cut off, which will not come to growth again. The Buddha is just like that, having eradicated birth and death he will never come to be born again."

When the Buddha proclaimed this teaching, the great thousand-fold world system shook three times in six ways. At that time Ānanda, who was standing behind the Buddha holding a fan and fanning the Buddha, uncovered his right arm, knelt down with folded hands, and said to the Buddha: "This teaching is very profound, what is its title, how to receive it respectfully?"

The Buddha told Ānanda: "This discourse is called the ⟨net⟩ of the essence, the ⟨net⟩ of the teaching, the ⟨net⟩ of views, the ⟨net⟩ of Māra, and the ⟨net⟩ of Brahmā."[n.123] [126] DĀ 21 at T I 94a12: 義動, 法動, 見動, 魔動, 梵動; the emendation is based on the assumption that the translation 動 is due to a mistaking of ˚jāla, "net", for ˚cāla, "stirring"; cf. above p. 61 note 21.

At that time Ānanda heard what the Buddha had said, was delighted, and received it respectfully.

The final part of the Brahmajāla treatment brings me back to the topic taken up at the beginning of this chapter, namely the relationship of the Tathāgata to views. I suggested that the Aggivacchagotta-sutta and its parallels contrast what views have to say about the Tathāgata to what the Tathāgata has to say about views; this contrast between entanglement in views and the aloofness of the Tathāgata, depicted in the Aggivacchagotta-sutta and its parallels, comes in for a more detailed treatment in the Brahmajāla-sutta and its parallels.

The above examination of altogether sixty-two grounds for views shows in detail how entanglement in views can take place, by offering a thorough analysis of the view-forming process.[n.124] [127] Katz 1982/1989: 150 speaks of the Brahmajāla as a "psychoanalysis of metaphysical claims". The main point of the Brahmajāla treatment as a whole appears to be the contrast between such entanglement and the aloofness of the Tathāgata. In this way, the Brahmajāla itself functions as an implementation of right view, inasmuch as the task of the exposition is to lay bare the causal undercurrent that is responsible for views, which is none other than craving.[n.125] [128] Bodhi 1978/1992: 9f explains that "the Buddha does not trouble to refute each separate view because the primary focus of his concern is not so much the content of the view as the underlying malady of which the addiction to speculative tenets is a symptom … the proper way to treat them is the same as that appropriate for the more general malady: to seek out their underlying causes and apply the remedy suitable for eliminating these causes. The remedy is the path which replaced the blindness of views with direct insight, the Noble Eightfold Path."

Craving arises based on feeling and contact, hence the recurrent reference to the Tathāgata's insight into the arising of feelings, their cessation, their gratification, their disadvantage, and the escape from them at the conclusion of each of the sections of the Brahmajāla analysis.[n.126] Evans 2009: 79 reasons that "because vedanā is excluded from explicit awareness and consideration, it distorts experience and [fuels] the formulation of views, from behind as it were." The Tathāgata is aloof from views by virtue of his penetrative insight into the very condition due to which they arise, which is none other than feeling. Feeling in turn is the product of contact, hence penetrative insight into the dependent arising of dukkha at the stage of contact will lead a disciple of the Buddha to the same aloofness from views.[n.127] [129] Fuller 2005: 115 concludes that "the Brahmajāla-sutta proposes neither a sixty-third view … nor the rejection of all views … but knowledge of the cessation of craving. This is right view. It is a clear example of sammā-diṭṭhi signifying that all views have been transcended."

The theme of entanglement in views also underlies the title of the discourse, the Brahmajāla, which the different versions of the present discourse attribute to the Buddha, together with some alternative titles. The Dīrgha-āgama differs inasmuch as it instead speaks of the "stirring of Brahmā". In the translation above I have emended this to the "⟨net⟩ of Brahmā ", as the reference to "stirring" is clearly an error due to a mistaking of ˚jāla, "net", for ˚cāla, "stirring", facilitated by the circumstance that in the original Prākrit these two would have been spelled similarly.[n.128] [131] Cf. above p. 61 note 21. A number of references to 梵動, *Brahmācāla, can be found in the Chinese canon, cf. T 25 at T I 420b1, T 1421 at T XXII 191a20, T 1428 at T XXII 833b25 (cf. also 968b15), T 1709 at T XXXIII 455c3, T 1764 at T XXXVII 812c25, T 1824 at T XLII 159c23, T 1828 at T XLII 348a13, and T 1830 at T XLIII 446b3. Although the quotation in the *Śāriputrābhidharma does not include the listing of titles, its introduction speaks of the "net of Brahmā", T 1548 at T XXVIII 656b19: 梵網.

The imagery of the Brahmajāla as a supreme net receives its explanation in the simile of the fisherman who spreads his net over a pond and thereby is able to catch all the living beings inside. In the same way, the net of sixty-two grounds for views is considered capable of covering the whole gamut of speculative views, enabling one to catch the very root of the view-forming process.

According to the Pāli commentary, this supreme net is spread by the Buddha.[n.129] [132] Sv I 127,18: kevaṭṭo viya hi bhagavā, jālaṃ viya desanā. The Pāli discourse itself does not give any explicit indication in this respect. According to the Sanskrit fragments, however, the net in which the recluses and brahmins have been caught is Māra's net.[n.130] [133] Fragments Pelliot 1400/19/bleu 35 R1f, Hartmann 1991: 86 (§16): sarv[e te] a(n)[t](arjā)[l](a)[g](a)[t](ā mārasya pāpīyasa āvaśa)[g](a)[t]ā vaśagat[ā] … [yathā]kāmakaraṇīyā mārasya pāpīyasaḥ. The Tibetan discourse similarly indicates that they have fallen into Māra's net, and the quotation in the Abhidharmakośopāyikā-ṭīkā also notes that they have been caught in Māra's net.[n.131] [134] Weller 1934: 62,5: bdud sdig can gyi dbang du song zhing lag tu; D 4094 ju 152b4 or Q 5595 tu 176a2: bdud sdig to can gyi dra bar chud cing dbang du gyur cing. That is, from the perspective of these versions the supreme net is Māra's net, rather than the Buddha's.

This seems more appropriate, since elsewhere in the discourses Māra is indeed the one who catches and binds other beings, whereas the Tathāgata guides them to liberation from bondage. This contrast is particularly evident in an exchange between the Buddha and Māra reported in the Saṃyutta-nikāya and its Saṃyukta-āgama parallels. According to the Pāli version of this exchange, Māra threatened to catch the Buddha in his snare.[n.132] [135] SN 4.15 at SN I 111,28: antalikkhacaro pāso … tena taṃ bādhayissāmi, na me samaṇa mokkhasi. The terminology employed in the two Saṃyukta-āgamas provides an even closer relationship to the Brahmajāla imagery, as instead of a "snare" they speak of a net with the help of which Māra hopes to catch the Buddha.[n.133] [136] SĀ 1086 at T II 285a6: 執長繩羂下, 正欲縛沙門, 不令汝得脫 (adopting the variant 正 instead of 政) and SĀ2 25 at T II 381c7: 羅網遍虛空, 沙門 於我所, 終不得解脫 (for a translation of SĀ2 25 cf. Bingenheimer 2007: 59).

The imagery of a net spread out occurs also in the Śvetāśvara Upaniṣad, where it illustrates the omnipotent power of a deva.[n.134] Śvet Up 5.3: ekaikaṃ jālam bahudhā vikurvan, asmin kṣetre saṃharaty eṣa devaḥ … sarvādhipatyaṃ kurute mahātmā, translated by Radhakrishnan 1953/ 1992: 739: "that God who after spreading out one net after another in various ways draws it together in that field … the great self exercises his lordship over all"; cf. also Franke 1913a: 47 note 3. This would further support associating the Brahmajāla imagery to Māra instead of the Buddha.[n.135] [137] Barua 1967: 12 comments that "the expression 'Brahmajāla' can be explained more clearly in comparison with Sanskrit 'Māyājāla' and 'Indrajālā'", concluding that "'Brahmā's net' … is evidently a metaphorical expression which means 'God's magic' or 'Brahmā's magic'."

Thus the perspective offered by the Sanskrit and Tibetan versions seems to fit the imagery better, in the sense that the net within which the view-holding recluses and brahmins are enmeshed has been spread by Māra. The Tathāgata only lays bare what holds this net together, which is craving, manifest in the sixty-two grounds for views that make up the threads of the net. But the Tathāgata is as aloof from views as he is aloof from the net; he has no need to catch others in a net, as his very aloofness would be beyond such involvement. Far from spreading a net that binds others, the Tathāgata's concern would only be to show the way out of the net of views, the path to liberation.

Mankind delights in conceptual proliferation, Tathāgatas are free from it.[n.136] [138] Dhp 254c–d: papañcābhiratā pajā, nippapañcā tathāgatā, a counterpart in the Udānavarga 29.38, Bernhard 1965: 382, similarly reads prapañcābhiratā bālā, niṣprapañcās tathāgatāḥ.