Introduction

With the present chapter I explore the theme of debate in early Buddhist discourse, in particular an account of the Buddha being challenged by the debater Saccaka,[n.1] In Anālayo 2009e, 2012d, and 2013b I have studied other cases of debate that involve non-Buddhists challenging instead a disciple of the Buddha. whom the texts introduce as a follower of the Jain tradition. The versions that report this challenge are as follows:

• the Cūḷasaccaka-sutta of the Majjhima-nikāya;[n.2] [1] MN 35 at MN I 227,15 to 237,3.
• a discourse in the Saṃyukta-āgama;[n.3] [2] SĀ 110 at T II 35a17 to 37b25.
• a discourse in the Ekottarika-āgama;[n.4] [3] EĀ 37.10 at T II 715a28 to 717b9.
• a version extant in a few Sanskrit fragments.[n.5] [4] Fragment I A, Bongard-Levin 1989: 509, and SHT III 997A, Waldschmidt 1971: 258, identified by Hartmann in Bechert and Wille 1995: 273. SHT III 997 is listed in Wille 2008: 418 as corresponding to MN 35 and as pertaining to the Kāyabhāvana-sūtra of the Skt Dīrgha-āgama, which parallels the Mahāsaccaka-sutta, MN 36, wherefore Chung 2008: 68 does not include these fragments in his survey of parallels to SĀ 110. Yet the recurrent reference to āsādya puruṣasya svastir bhāvo in both fragments parallels a section in MN 35 at MN I 236,3, SĀ 110 at T II 37a9, and EĀ 37.10 at T II 716c7 where Saccaka illustrates his inability to vanquish the Buddha with various similes. In fact MN 35 at MN I 236,3–10 repeatedly uses the corresponding wording āsajja purisassa sotthibhāvo, whereas MN 36 does not have a comparable formulation. Thus these two fragments appear to be parallels to MN 35, SĀ 110, and EĀ 37.10. They at the same time pertain to the Kāyabhāvana-sūtra preserved in Sanskrit fragments stemming from a Mūlasarvāstivāda Dīrgha-āgama collection, since this discourse, although otherwise a parallel to MN 36, in its concluding section also reports how Saccaka (referred to as Sātyaki) illustrates his failure to overcome the Buddha with a set of similes; cf. fragment 339v3–6, Liu 2010: 123, where the same phrase āsādya puruṣasya svastir bhāvo occurs repeatedly. The same fragment indicates that this is the second time Sātyaki has approached the Buddha for debate; cf. fragment 339v7, Liu 2010: 124, which shows awareness of the existence of a version of their first encounter, recorded in MN 35, SĀ 110, and EĀ 37.10. The occurrence of the set of similes in the Kāyabhāvana-sūtra could easily be the result of a transfer of this part during oral transmission, facilitated by the circumstance that the two discourses to Sātyaki share the same protagonist being defeated in a debate by the Buddha.

In what follows I translate the Saṃyukta-āgama version.

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Translation

[Discourse to Saccaka][n.6] The translated discourse is SĀ 110 at T II 35a17 to 37b25. The title can be deduced from the uddāna at T II 37b27: 薩遮. For ease of comparison I adopt the paragraph numbering used in the English translation of the Cūḷasaccaka-sutta in Ñāṇamoli 1995/2005: 322–331.

1. Thus have I heard. At one time the Buddha was staying at Vesālī by the side of the Monkey Pond.[n.7] SĀ 110 at T II 35a17: 獼猴池. As noted by Skilling 1997: 295, the Monkey Pond by Vesālī seems to be unknown in the Pāli discourses; cf. also Lamotte 1958/1988: 155, Skilling 1997: 406f, and Bingenheimer 2008b: 159 note 31. References to the Monkey Pond can be found in the Avadānaśataka, Speyer 1906/1970: 8,5, the Bhaiṣajyavastu of the Mūlasarvāstivāda Vinaya, Dutt 1984a: 224,14, the Buddhacarita, T 192 at T IV 43c12 (cf. also Johnston 1936/1995: 75 stanza 23.63), the Divyāvadāna, Cowell and Neil 1886: 136,7, the Mahā-vastu, Senart 1882b: 300,11, a Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra fragment, S 360 folio 173V5–6, Waldschmidt 1950: 19, and in a Sanskrit fragment parallel to the Mahāsīhanāda-sutta (MN 12), SHT IV 32 folio 41 R5, Sander and Waldschmidt 1980: 137. Besides occurring frequently in the Saṃyukta-āgama, the same location is also mentioned in the Dīrgha-āgama and the Ekottarika-āgama; cf. DĀ 15 at T I 66a23 and EĀ 40.5 at T II 739b10. Xuánzàng (玄奘) also refers to it; cf. T 2087 at T LI 908b17, translated by Beal 1884/2001: 68.

2. In the country of Vesālī there was a son of the Nigaṇṭhas who was intelligent and clever,[n.8] SĀ 110 at T II 35a18: 尼揵子, a "son of the Nigaṇṭhas", an expression found similarly in EĀ 37.10 at T II 715b1, with its counterpart in nigaṇṭhaputta in MN 35 at MN I 227,17; cf. also a similar reference in a Tocharian fragment no. 20, Sieg and Siegling 1949: 32. According to the Pāli commentary, Ps II 268,7, his parents had been Nigaṇṭhas. The Sanskrit fragments of the Kāyabhāvana-sūtra repeatedly employ the expression nigranthīputra (cf., e.g., 329r5 in Liu 2010: 101), an expression also used in the Viyāhapaṇṇatti 5.8.1, Lalwani 1974: 210, as the name of a particular Jain monk. skilled at understanding any doctrine. He was proud of his intelligence and of his refined knowledge of vast collections of doctrines and their subtle details. When giving teachings to assemblies, he surpassed all [other] debaters and he kept on thinking:

"Among recluses and brahmins I am unrivalled, able to debate even with a Tathāgata. On [merely] hearing my name, any kind of debater will have sweat pouring forth from his forehead, armpits, and the pores of his hair. [When] debating a matter, I am [like a strong] wind that is able to flatten grass and trees, break up metal and stone, and subdue serpents and elephants – what to say of any kind of debater among humans being able to equal me?"[n.9] MN 35 at MN I 227,18 introduces a similar set of presumptions as public claims made by Saccaka. The introductory narration of EĀ 37.10 at T II 715a29 does not provide a description of Saccaka, hence it has these presumptions neither as reflections nor as public claims made by Saccaka. Notably, later on SĀ 110 also considers these as public claims; cf. below note 36.

3. Then a monk by the name of Assaji, having put on the [outer] robe and taken his bowl in the morning, entered the town to beg for food with awe-inspiring and decorous behaviour, walking calmly and with eyes lowered. At that time Saccaka, the son of the Nigaṇṭhas, who owing to some small matter was going to the villages, was coming out of the town gate and saw from afar the monk Assaji.[n.10] MN 35 and EĀ 37.10 neither describe the inspiring and calm manner in which Assaji went begging, nor do they indicate that Saccaka had some matter to attend to. He approached him and asked:

4. "What teachings does the recluse Gotama give to his disciples, what are the teachings with which he instructs his disciples for their practice?"

Assaji replied: "Aggivessana, the Blessed One instructs his disciples with teachings for them to train accordingly in this way, saying: 'Monks, bodily form should be contemplated as being not-self, feeling … perception … formations … consciousness should be contemplated as being not-self. Make an effort to contemplate the five aggregates of clinging as a disease, as a carbuncle, as a thorn, as a killer, as impermanent, as dukkha, as empty, as not-self'."[n.11] Assaji's reply in MN 35 at MN I 228,10 does not bring in the characteristic of dukkha, only mentioning impermanence and not-self. His reply in EĀ 37.10 at T II 715b4 covers all three characteristics, however, indicating that each aggregate is impermanent, what is impermanent is unsatisfactory, and what is unsatisfactory is not-self.

On hearing these words, the mind of Saccaka, the son of the Nigaṇṭhas, was not delighted and he said:[n.12] According to EĀ 37.10 at T II 715b10, Saccaka was so displeased that he covered his ears with his hands and told Assaji: "Stop, stop!"

"Assaji, you certainly heard wrongly, the recluse Gotama would not speak like this at all.[n.13] MN 35 and EĀ 37.10 do not report that Saccaka assumed Assaji may have misheard what the Buddha teaches. The counterpart passage in MN 35 at MN I 228,16 reads: dussutaṃ vata, bho assaji, assumha. If a similarly worded passage should have been found in the Indic original used for translating the Saṃyukta-āgama, a mistake could have arisen by assuming dussuta to mean that Assaji had "misheard", instead of being an expression of Saccaka's displeasure at having "heard [something] improper" (cf. the gloss in Ps II 271,18 on dussutaṃ as sotuṃ ayuttaṃ). The term as such can have both meanings: in MN 97 at MN II 185,21 dussuta refers to hearing something that is improper or disagreeable, thus being similar to MN 35, whereas in MN 76 at MN I 520,6 dussuta stands for what has been misheard, contrasted to what has been heard correctly, sussuta. If the recluse Gotama does speak like this, then this is a wrong view and I shall approach him, argue with him, and closely interrogate him, so as to stop him [from speaking like this]."

5. At that time, Saccaka, the son of the Nigaṇṭhas, approached the villages. He told the Licchavis, who had gathered in the assembly hall of the Licchavis:

"Today I met a foremost disciple of the recluse Gotama by the name of Assaji and we had a small debate on a matter. According to what he has told me, I shall approach that recluse Gotama and, debating the matter with him, I will certainly make him advance, retreat, and turn around according to my wish.

"It is just as a man mowing grass might pull out the grass at its roots and, grabbing the stalks with his hand, shake it in the air to get rid of any dirt. In the same way I shall debate that matter with the recluse Gotama, argue with him, and closely interrogate him, taking hold of what is essential and making him advance, retreat, and turn around according to my wish, getting rid of his mistaken assertions.

"[Or] it is just as, in a liquor shop, someone might take a liquor filter and press it to get pure wine and to get rid of the residual grains. In the same way I shall approach the recluse Gotama, debate and ⟨argue⟩ with him, [n.14] Adopting the emendation of 義 to 議, suggested in the CBETA edition; cf. also Yìnshùn 1983a: 204. closely interrogate him, taking hold of the pure essence and making him advance, retreat, and turn around, getting rid of any mistaken assertions.

"[Or] it is like a master in weaving mats who, wanting to sell a dirty mat in the market, will wash it with water to get rid of any smell or dirt. In the same way I shall approach the recluse Gotama and debate that matter with him, taking hold of what is essential, making him advance, retreat, and turn around, getting rid of any tainted assertions.

"[Or] it is just as if a master elephant trainer in a king's household were to lead a large and drunken elephant into deep water to wash its body, the four limbs, ears, trunk, washing it all round to get rid of any dust or dirt.[n.15] Adopting the variant 塵 instead of 麁; cf. also Yìnshùn 1983a: 212 note 3. In the same way I shall approach the recluse Gotama, debate and argue that matter with him, closely interrogate him, make him advance, retreat, and turn around according to my free will, taking hold of the main points and getting rid of any dirty assertions.[n.16] [14] MN 35 at MN I 228,29 also has four similes, which describe dragging a sheep by its hair, dragging a brewer's sieve around, shaking a brewer's strainer, and an elephant who plays in water. The images of dragging a sheep by its hair and of an elephant that plays in water recur in EĀ 37.10 at T II 715b20, which besides these two has one more simile of two strong men who take hold of a weak third man and roast him over a fire. Licchavis, you may come with me to see how he will be defeated."

6. Among the Licchavis there were some who spoke like this: "That Saccaka, the son of the Nigaṇṭhas, will be able to [hold his ground] in debating that matter with the recluse Gotama, that is not possible." Others said: "Saccaka, the son of the Nigaṇṭhas, is intelligent and of sharp faculties, he will be able to [hold his ground] in debating that matter."

Then Saccaka, the son of the Nigaṇṭhas, together with five hundred Licchavis, approached the Buddha for the purpose of debating the matter.

7. At that time the Blessed One was seated beneath a tree in the Great Wood for the day's abiding,[n.17] [15] SĀ 110 at T II 35c3: 天住, an expression which, pace Bingenheimer 2008a: 14 note 32, I consider to correspond to the "day's abiding", divāvihāra, mentioned in MN 35 at MN I 229,23, instead of meaning a "heavenly abiding" (both meanings would be possible interpretations; cf. Hirakawa 1997: 333, who lists diva alongside deva and divya as possible meanings for 天). In the Pāli discourses, a "heavenly abiding", dibba vihāra, does not occur on its own as part of a circumstantial description, comparable to the present context. Instead, it forms part of a set of three types of vihāras, the "heavenly", dibba, the "divine", brahmā, and the "noble", ariya; cf. DN 33 at DN III 220,18. A counterpart to this set of three can be found in Stache-Rosen 1968a: 88, whose reconstruction is based on the Saṅgītiparyāya, T 1536 at T XXVI 389a7: 三住者: 一天住, 二梵住, 三 聖住, and on an unpublished manuscript, Hs M 658, line 3 of which reads [divyo] vihāro brahmo vihāra āryavihāraḥ, cited in Stache-Rosen 1968b: 57 note 173. The same set of three recurs in a different sequence in the parallel DĀ 9 at T I 50b14: 三堂: 賢聖堂, 天堂, 梵堂. An explanation of the implication of such dibba vihāra can be found in AN 3.63 at AN I 182,27, according to which the mental condition to be experienced after attainment of the four absorptions can be reckoned as "heavenly"; cf. also the Saṅgītiparyāya, T 1536 at T XXVI 389a7: 天住云何, 答謂四靜慮. The expression divāvihāra, in contrast, simply stands for any type of meditation practice, this forming the "day's abiding" regularly practised, in whatever form, by the Buddha and his monastic disciples. Such "day's abiding" certainly does not exclude deep concentration, as can be seen in a passage in MĀ 153 at T I 670b25, where the Buddha's "day's abiding", 晝行 (the counterpart MN 75 at MN I 501,ult. similarly refers to his divāvihāra), involves the exercise of the divine eye, clearly indicating that in this case his "day's abiding" would at the same time also have fulfilled the conditions required for a "heavenly abiding", namely absorption attainment. In the case of another occurrence of 晝行 in MĀ 171 at T I 706c18, however, a monk listens to and well remembers a conversation that is going on not too far from the place where he is seated in his "day's abiding", an instance where the expression does not seem to stand for abiding in deep concentration. Yet another occurrence of 晝行 in MĀ 213 at T I 795c9 has as its counterpart nyin mo gnas, "day's abiding", in the Tibetan Mūlasarvāstivāda Vinaya, D 6 tha 82b6 or Q 1035 de 79b4, thereby confirming this sense for a text from the Mūlasarvāstivāda tradition as well, although its Chinese counterpart, T 1451 at T XXIV 237a26, instead speaks of 靜慮. while many monks were outside of the [monastic] dwelling, practising walking meditation in the forest. They saw from afar that Saccaka, the son of the Nigaṇṭhas, was coming. He gradually approached the monks and asked them: "Where is the recluse Gotama staying?"

The monks answered: "He is [seated] beneath a tree in the Great Wood for the day's abiding."

8. Saccaka, the son of the Nigaṇṭhas, approached the Buddha, paid respect and, after exchanging greetings, sat to one side. The Licchavi householders also approached the Buddha, some of them paid respect, others held their hands with palms together [in homage], exchanged greetings and, having exchanged greetings, stood to one side.[n.18] [16] Whereas EĀ 37.10 does not record the behaviour of the Licchavis at all, MN 35 at MN I 229,27 describes a broader variety of behaviour, with some Licchavis announcing their name and others just remaining silent, although all of them sit down.

9. Then Saccaka, the son of the Nigaṇṭhas, said to the Buddha: "I have heard that Gotama gives such teachings and such instructions to his disciples, instructing his disciples to contemplate bodily form as being not-self, to contemplate feeling … perception … formations … consciousness as being not-self; making an effort to contemplate the five aggregates of clinging as a disease, as a carbuncle, as a thorn, as a killer, as impermanent, as dukkha, as empty, as not-self.[n.19] [17] Instead of reporting what he had heard from Assaji, in MN 35 at MN I 230,1 and EĀ 37.10 at T II 715c10 Saccaka asks the Buddha the same question he had earlier asked Assaji (with some minor differences in wording in EĀ 37.10).

"Does Gotama teach in this way or does this report misrepresent Gotama? Is this said as it was said or is it not said as it was said? Is this said according to the Dharma, is it said in accordance with the Dharma, so that there is nothing causing one to fall into an occasion of being defeated in a situation of being argued with and closely interrogated by another person who has come?"[n.20] [18&19] Adopting the variant 人 instead of 忍. Although this passage does not have a counterpart in MN 35 (or EĀ 37.10), a similar mode of enquiry occurs in other discourses in the Majjhima-nikāya; cf., e.g., MN 55 at MN I 368,28, MN 71 at MN I 482,12, MN 90 at MN II 127,4, MN 103 at MN II 243,11, and MN 126 at MN III 139,31. On the formulation employed for this type of enquiry cf. Alsdorf 1959.

The Buddha told Saccaka, the son of the Nigaṇṭhas: "What you have heard is said as it was said, it is said according to the Dharma, it is said in accordance with the Dharma, it is not a misrepresentation and there is nothing causing one to fall into an occasion of being defeated on being argued with and closely interrogated. Why is that?

"I truly deliver such teachings to my disciples, I truly continuously instruct my disciples, so that in conformity with my teaching and instruction they contemplate bodily form as being not-self … feeling … perception … formations … consciousness as being not-self, and contemplate these five aggregates of clinging as a disease, as a carbuncle, as a thorn, as a killer, as impermanent, as dukkha, as empty, as not-self."

10. Saccaka, the son of the Nigaṇṭhas, said to the Buddha: "Gotama, I shall now speak a simile."

The Buddha told Saccaka, the son of the Nigaṇṭhas: "Know that it is the proper time for it."

[Saccaka said]: "It is just as whatever is done in the world all depends on the earth,[n.21] [20] That the earth is the basis for the growth of beings and their activities, MN 35 at MN I 230,14: paṭhaviyaṃ patiṭṭhāya (Be: pathaviyaṃ), appears to have been a general tenet in ancient India. Several discourses report the Buddha referring to this position; cf., e.g., SN 45.149 at SN V 45,26, SN 45.150 at SN V 46,14, SN 46.11 at SN V 78,1, SN 49.23 at SN V 246,1, SĀ 880 at T II 221c10, SĀ 882 at T II 221c24, SĀ 901 at T II 225c15, SĀ 903 at T II 225c26, SĀ 904 at T II 226a3, and SĀ 1239 at T II 339b25. The same position was apparently upheld by the Jains, as in the Viyāhapaṇṇatti 1.224, Lalwani 1973: 97,6, Mahāvīra proclaims that: puḍhavīpaïṭṭhiyā tasā thāvarā pāṇā, trsl. ibid.: "the earth is the base for … moving and non-moving beings." in the same way bodily form is a person's self, from which good and evil arise, feeling … perception … formations … consciousness is a person's self, from which good and evil arise.[n.22] [21] For a full appreciation of the position taken by Saccaka, it needs to be considered in the light of the standard early Buddhist analysis of what underlies an assertion of selfhood. This analysis distinguishes between twenty forms of identifying the five aggregates as a self. These are arrived at by relating each of the five aggregates to the following four modes: a) identifying an aggregate as the self, b) postulating that the self is what possesses an aggregate, c) assuming the self to contain an aggregate within, d) locating the self within an aggregate. Now in MN 35 at MN I 230,20 Saccaka indicates that according to his self-conception a person rūpe patiṭṭhāya puññaṃ vā apuññaṃ vā pasavati, "with bodily form as the basis engenders merit and demerit", a formula then applied to the other four aggregates as well. This suggests Saccaka's view to be that the five aggregates are adjuncts of the self, corresponding to mode (b) of the four modes mentioned above. In fact, the use of the expression patiṭṭhāya clearly harks back to the simile of the earth, found also in SĀ 110, so that the aggregates are to the self what the earth is to beings. MN 35 at MN I 230,26 then continues with the Buddha ascertaining that this proposition can be reckoned as one of the modes of identifying the aggregates as self: nanu tvaṃ … evaṃ vadesi: rūpaṃ me attā, "are you not [thereby] asserting that 'bodily form (etc.) is my self'?" Thus Saccaka's view described in MN 35 and SĀ 110 need not be confined to the above mode (a) and thus does reflect self notions held among contemporary Jains or brahmins, pace Kuan 2009: 163ff and 170. EĀ 37.10 at T II 715c18 differs from the other two versions in so far as here the issue at stake is whether form, etc., are permanent or impermanent; in fact Saccaka continues to affirm that bodily form is permanent. The progression of this part in EĀ 37.10 is so different that it makes a detailed comparison impossible, hence in some footnotes I only mention variations between SĀ 110 and MN 35.

"Again, just as in the realm of humans, [or] in the realm of [earthen] spirits, all herbs, grass, trees, and woods depend on the earth for their arising and growth, in the same way bodily form is a person's self, feeling … perception … formations … consciousness is a person's self."

11. The Buddha said: "Aggivessana, do you say that bodily form is a person's self, that feeling … perception … formations … consciousness is a person's self?"

He replied: "It is like this, Gotama, bodily form is a person's self, feeling … perception … formations … consciousness is a person's self – and this whole assembly says the same."

The Buddha said: "Aggivessana, just keep to your own doctrine. [What] is the use of bringing in the people in the assembly?"

Saccaka, the son of the Nigaṇṭhas, said to the Buddha: "Bodily form is truly a person's self."

12. The Buddha said: "Aggivessana, I shall now question you, answer me according to your understanding. It is just as the king of a country who in his own country can put to death a man who has committed a crime, or bind him, or expel him, or have him be whipped and his hands and feet cut off; and if someone has done a meritorious deed, [the king can] grant him the gift of an elephant, a horse, a vehicle, a town, or wealth – could he not do all that?"[n.23] [22] MN 35 at MN I 231,4 illustrates the king's power by bringing in the examples of King Pasenadi and King Ajātasattu, differing from SĀ 110 also in that it does not take up the positive case of rewarding those who have done something positive.

He answered: "He could do it, Gotama."
The Buddha said: "Aggivessana, whoever is the owner, would he not be totally free to do anything he likes?"[n.24] [23] This additional enquiry, driving home the implication of the simile on the king, is without a counterpart in MN 35.

He answered: "It is like this, Gotama."
13. The Buddha said: "Aggivessana, you say that bodily form is a person's self, that feeling … perception … formations … consciousness is a person's self, [but] are you able, in accordance with your wish, freely, to have them be like this, [or] not be like this?"

Then Saccaka, the son of the Nigaṇṭhas, remained silent. The Buddha said: "Aggivessana, come now and speak, come now and speak. Why do you remain silent?"

In the same way for three times Saccaka, the son of the Nigaṇṭhas, remained silent as before.

14. Then a powerful thunderbolt spirit, holding a thunderbolt, fierce and blazing with fire, staying in the empty space close above the head of Saccaka, the son of the Nigaṇṭhas, said: "The Blessed One has asked you three times. Why do you not reply? With this thunderbolt I shall break your head into seven pieces!"[n.25] [24] The intervention of this spirit is similarly reported in MN 35 at MN I 231,30 and EĀ 37.10 at T II 716a7, a minor difference being that in the Pāli version he appears before the Buddha repeats his question a third time, whereas in the two Chinese versions he takes action once the third repetition of the question has not met with a reply. Ps II 277,ult. explains that this spirit (named Vajirapāṇi/金剛力士 in MN 35 and EĀ 37.10) was a manifestation of Sakka; cf. also Godage 1945: 51–52. On the threat that an opponent's head will split to pieces in ancient Indian literature cf., e.g., Hopkins 1932: 316, Insler 1989/ 1990, Witzel 1987, Black 2007: 80–88 and 2011: 154–158.

Owing to the Buddha's supernormal power,[n.26] [25] MN 35 at MN I 231,35 agrees with SĀ 110 that only Saccaka and the Buddha could see the spirit, without, however, indicating that this was due to the Buddha's supernatural power. In EĀ 37.10 at T II 716a10 Saccaka apparently at first does not notice the spirit and only realizes what is happening when the Buddha tells him to look up into the sky. only Saccaka, the son of the Nigaṇṭhas, saw the thunderbolt spirit; the rest of the assembly did not see it.

15. Saccaka, the son of the Nigaṇṭhas, became greatly afraid and said to the Buddha:[n.27] [26] When describing Saccaka's fear, MN 35 at MN I 232,1 indicates that he was seeking from the Buddha protection, tāṇa, shelter, leṇa, and refuge, saraṇa; cf. also EĀ 37.10 at T II 716a13. "No, Gotama."

16–19. The Buddha said: "Aggivessana, pay steady attention and reply after having understood. Earlier in this assembly you proclaimed that bodily form is the self, that feeling … perception … formations … consciousness is the self, yet now you say it is not so. The earlier and the latter contradict each other.[n.28] [27] This remark, with its counterparts in MN 35 at MN I 232,8 and EĀ 37.10 at T II 716a18, is noteworthy in so far as it shows clearly that in early Buddhist thought "consistency is regarded as a criterion of truth"; cf. Jayatilleke 1963/1980: 334. You earlier kept on saying: 'Bodily form is the self, feeling … perception … formations … consciousness is the self.'[n.29] [28] Instead of reminding him of the position he earlier took, in MN 35 at MN I 232,4 the Buddha takes up each aggregate individually and enquires about the possibility of controlling it, in each case concluding that the reply Saccaka gives does not square with what he upheld before.

20. "Aggivessana, now I will ask you: is bodily form permanent or is it impermanent?"

He answered: "It is impermanent, Gotama."[n.30] [29] MN 35 at MN I 232,ult. proceeds similarly, differing from SĀ 110 in that it does not refer to the well-taught noble disciple. In EĀ 37.10, however, at this point the Buddha states that even a wheel-turning king will grow old. A counterpart to the teachings given in SĀ 110 and MN 35 on the true nature of the five aggregates occurs only later in EĀ 37.10 at T II 716b25.

[The Buddha] asked again: "What is impermanent, is it dukkha?"

He answered: "It is dukkha, Gotama."
[The Buddha] asked again: "What is impermanent, dukkha and of a nature to change, would a learned noble disciple herein see it as a self, as distinct from the self [in the sense of being owned by it],[n.31] [30] SĀ 110 at T II 36a28: 異我, the supplementation of "[in the sense of being owned by it]" suggests itself from SĀ 109 at T II 34b20, where the question "how is form regarded as 'distinct from self'?", 云何見色異我, receives the reply "[by] regarding form as 'this is mine'", 見色是我所; cf. also note 32 below. as existing [within the self, or the self] as existing [within it]?"[n.32] [31] SĀ 110 at T II 36a28: 相在, literally "mutually existing". As Choong 2000: 59 explains, the cryptic formulation 是我, 異我, 相在 functions in the Saṃyukta-āgama as the counterpart to the three-partite Pāli set phrase etaṃ mama, eso 'ham asmi, eso ma attā, "this is mine, this I am, this is my self", found in the present case in MN 35 at MN I 232,ult. Choong notes that the same Saṃyukta-āgama formulation also parallels a four-partite Pāli set phrase where the self is regarded as identical with an aggregate, as what possesses an aggregate, as containing an aggregate within, or as itself being within the aggregate (e.g. for the first aggregate of bodily form in MN 44 at MN I 300,7: rūpaṃ attato … rūpavantaṃ vā attānaṃ, attani vā rūpaṃ, rūpasmiṃ vā attānaṃ, with a similarly worded Tibetan counterpart in D 4094 ju 7a2 or Q 5595 tu 7b7: gzugs bdag yin no … gzugs bdag dang ldan, bdag la gzugs yod, gzugs la bdag gnas, and a straightforward rendering in the Chinese parallel MĀ 210 at T I 788a28 as: 見色是神, 見神有色, 見神中有色, 見色中有神也). In the case of Saṃyukta-āgama passages paralleling this four-partite formula, 相在 covers the last two alternatives, as can be seen in SĀ 45 at T II 11b5: 色是我, 色異我, 我 在色, 色在我, which is then summarized two lines later as 色是我, 異我, 相 在. This suggests that 相在 is probably best rendered as the aggregate "existing [within the self, or the self] existing [within it]".

He answered: "No, Gotama."
Feeling … perception … formations … consciousness should also be recited like this.

The Buddha said: "Aggivessana, you [should] attend well and then speak."

21. [The Buddha] asked again: "Aggivessana, if one is not free from lust in regard to bodily form, not free from desire for it, not free from [fondly] thinking about it, not free from craving for it, not free from thirst in regard to it, if that bodily form changes, if it becomes otherwise, will sadness, sorrow, vexation, and pain arise?"[n.33] [32] This argument is not found in MN 35, although it occurs in other Pāli discourses; cf., e.g., SN 22.84 at SN III 107,5.

He answered: "It is like this, Gotama."
Feeling … perception … formations … consciousness should also be recited like this.

[The Buddha] asked again: "Aggivessana, if one is free from lust in regard to bodily form, free from desire for it, free from [fondly] thinking about it, free from craving for it, free from thirst in regard to it, if that bodily form then changes, if it becomes otherwise, will sadness, sorrow, vexation, and pain not arise?"

He answered: "It is like this, Gotama; this is true and not otherwise."

Feeling, perception, formations and consciousness should also be recited like this.

[The Buddha said]: "Aggivessana, it is just like a person whose body is afflicted by various types of pain, being constantly accompanied by pain, pain that does not cease, does not go away. Will [this person] be able to get delight from that?"[n.34] [33] In MN 35 at MN I 233,9 the Buddha instead points out that someone who regards as self what in reality is dukkha will not be able to transcend dukkha.

He answered: "No, Gotama."
[The Buddha said]: "It is like this, Aggivessana. A [person whose] body is afflicted by various types of pain, being constantly accompanied by pain, suffering pain that does not cease, does not go away, will not be able to get delight from that.

22. "Aggivessana, it is just as if a person in search of solid heartwood were to enter a mountain, carrying an axe. On seeing a very large and perfectly straight plantain tree, he cuts it at the root and removes the sheaths, taking off the skin until nothing is left. [He would find that it is] totally without a solid essence.[n.35] [34] This simile has a counterpart in MN 35 at MN I 233,15, although it is absent from EĀ 37.10. The Buddha's subsequent reminding Saccaka of his earlier boasting, however, is reported in all three versions. Aggivessana, you are also like that. Your self-established arguments have come to an end. I have now properly searched for their true and real essence. They are totally without solid essence, like a plantain tree.

"Yet, among this assembly you dared to make the declaration: 'I do not see, among recluses or brahmins who possess knowledge and possess vision, [even] a Tathāgata, an arahant, a fully awakened one who possesses knowledge and possesses vision, who is able to take part in debating a matter without being shattered and defeated [by me].'

"You also said of yourself:[n.36] [35] Here Saccaka's claims are presented as something he said, T II 36b18: 說, whereas earlier they were introduced as his reflections, T II 35a20: 念, cf. also above note 9. '[When] debating a matter, I am [like a strong] wind that flattens grass and trees, breaks up metal and stones, and subdues serpents or elephants, I am certainly able to cause others to have their sweat pour forth from their forehead, armpits, and the pores of their hair.' Now you have not established your own doctrine and your own matter, [although] at first you boasted of being able to subdue the modes of [thought of] others. Now you have reached your own [wits'] end and you have not been able to stir a single hair of the Tathāgata."

At that time the Blessed One, in that great assembly, took off his upper robe and bared his chest, [saying]: "Try to see if you could stir a single hair of the Tathāgata!"[n.37] [36] In MN 35 at MN I 233,35 and EĀ 37.10 at T II 716b5 the Buddha uncovers his upper body in order to show that he is not sweating, unlike Saccaka. In a record of this episode in the *Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa (大智度論), T 1509 T XXV 251c16, translated by Lamotte 1944/1970: 1666, the point of the Buddha baring his chest is also to show the absence of sweat.

At that time, Saccaka, the son of the Nigaṇṭhas, lowered his head in silence, pale and ashamed.

23. At that time in the assembly there was a Licchavi named Dummukha, who got up from his seat, arranged his clothes and, holding his hands with palms together [in respect] towards the Buddha, said: "Blessed One, allow me to speak a simile."

The Buddha said: "Dummukha, know that it is the proper time for it."

Dummukha said to the Buddha: "Blessed One, it is as if a person were to take just a peck-sized or ten-peck-sized [container] in order to gather twenty or thirty pecks from a great heap of grains. Now this Saccaka, the son of the Nigaṇṭhas, is just like that.

"Blessed One, it is as if a householder of great wealth and much treasure were to commit a transgression out of neglect, due to which all his wealth [is confiscated] and taken to the king's household. Saccaka, the son of the Nigaṇṭhas, is just like that, his ability at arguing has been completely taken away by the Tathāgata.[n.38] [37] This and the previous simile are not found in MN 35 or EĀ 37.10, which only have counterparts to the next simile of the crab.

"It is as if there was a big pond alongside a town or village. Men and women, young and old, are all playing in the water and, having caught a crab in the water, cut off its legs and then put it on the dry ground. Because of having no legs, it is unable to go back into the big pond. Saccaka, the son of the Nigaṇṭhas, is also like that. All his ability at arguing has been completely cut off by the Tathāgata, he will never again dare to approach the Tathāgata and challenge him to debate a matter."

24. At that time, Saccaka, the son of the Nigaṇṭhas, was angry and upset. He upbraided the Licchavi Dummukha, [n.39] [38] Adopting the variant 呵 instead of 唾. saying: "You are rude and impolite! Not having investigated the truth, why are you yapping? I am discussing with the recluse Gotama myself. Will you mind your own business?"

Having upbraided Dummukha, Saccaka, the son of the Nigaṇṭhas, in turn said to the Buddha: "Let be that ordinary low-level kind of talk. Now I have another question."[n.40] [39] The section beginning with the present question, up to Saccaka's admission of defeat (27), is without counterpart in EĀ 37.10, which instead reports how the Buddha teaches Saccaka the true nature of the five aggregates.

The Buddha told Saccaka, the son of the Nigaṇṭhas: "Feel free to ask, I will answer in accordance with your question."

[Saccaka asked]: "Gotama, how do you give teachings to your disciples so that they become free from doubt?"

The Buddha said: "Aggivessana, I tell my disciples: 'Whatever bodily form, whether past, future, or present, internal or external, gross or subtle, sublime or repugnant, far or near, it should all be contemplated as it really is as not-self, not distinct from the self [in the sense of being owned by it], as not existing [within the self, nor a self] as existing [within it].'"[n.41] [40] SĀ 110 at T II 36c18: 非我, 非異我, 不相在, cf. above notes 31 and 32.

Feeling … perception … formations … consciousness … is also like this.

"Training [like this] they will certainly come to see the path and not abandon it or let it come to ruin, being able to achieve dispassion, knowledge, and vision, [thereby] taking hold of the door to the deathless.[n.42] [41] SĀ 110 at T II 36c20: 守甘露門, where in my translation I follow the indication in Hirakawa 1997: 371 that 守, besides its main meaning of "guarding" and "preserving", can also render ādāya, a sense that seems to fit the present context best. A reference to the door of the deathless is not found in the counterpart passage in MN 35. Even though they do not all attain the supreme, yet they [all] move towards Nirvāṇa.[n.43] [42] This sentence is without counterpart in MN 35. A disciple who is taught the Dharma by me in this way reaches freedom from doubt."

25. [Saccaka] asked again: "Gotama, how do you further instruct your disciples so that in the Buddha's teaching they attain the destruction of the influxes, the influx-free liberation of the mind and liberation by wisdom, here and now personally knowing and realizing: 'Birth for me has been eradicated, the holy life has been established, what had to be done has been done, I myself know that there will be no experiencing of further existence'?"

The Buddha said: "Aggivessana, by properly employing this [same] teaching: 'Whatever bodily form, whether past, future or present, internal or external, gross or subtle, sublime or repugnant, far or near, it should all be contemplated as it really is as not-self, as not distinct from the self [in the sense of being owned by it], as not existing [within the self, nor a self] as existing [within it].'

Feeling … perception … formations … consciousness … is also like this.

26. "At the time of [contemplating like this] they accomplish three unsurpassable qualities: unsurpassable knowledge, unsurpassable awakening, and unsurpassable liberation.[n.44] [43] Adopting the variant readings 道無上 and 解脫無上 for the second and third item; cf. also Yìnshùn 1983a: 212 note 5. The Taishō edition of SĀ 110 at T II 37a1 instead refers to 解脫無上 and 解脫知見無上, "unsurpassable liberation" and "unsurpassable knowledge and vision of liberation". MN 35 at MN I 235,28 speaks of "unsurpassable vision", dassanānuttariya, "unsurpassable path of practice", paṭipadānuttariya, and "unsurpassable liberation", vimuttānuttariya. A listing of the same set of three in DN 33 at DN III 219,17 agrees with MN 35. A Sanskrit fragment parallel from the Saṅgīti-sūtra has preserved (jñānā)[nutta]ryaṃ prati(padānuttaryaṃ); cf. K 484 (37) V8, Stache-Rosen 1968a: 23. The relevant section in the Saṅgītiparyāya, T 1536 at T XXVI 390c29, speaks of "unsurpassable practice", 行無上, "unsurpassable knowledge", 智無上, "unsurpassable liberation", 解脫無上. The above instances support adopting the variant readings in the case of SĀ 110. Having accomplished these three unsurpassable qualities, they honour the great teacher, esteem, and worship him as a Buddha: 'The Blessed One has realized all teachings, and with these teachings he tames his disciples so that they attain peace, so that they attain fearlessness, are tamed, at peace, and [attain] the ultimate, Nirvāṇa. For the sake of Nirvāṇa the Blessed One gives teachings to his disciples.'[n.45] [44] In the parallel passage in MN 35 at MN I 235,30 several qualities of the Buddha's own realization are shown to be at the same time the goal of his teaching. Thus, e.g., the Buddha is "awakened", buddha, and teaches the Dharma for the sake of "awakening", bodhi (on rendering derivatives of √buj as "awaken" instead of "enlighten" cf. Norman 1990: 26, Collins 1998: 213, Gimello 2004: 50, and Anālayo 2011b: xxiii note 9; cf. also MN 54 at MN I 365,31, where paṭibuddho describes someone who wakes up from sleep). MN 35 then applies the same pattern to being "tamed", danta, "at peace", santa, having "transcended", tiṇṇa, and being "appeased", parinibbuta. Carter 1978: 94 comments on the present passage that apperceiving this consistency between what the Buddha has reached himself and what he teaches others is what inspires reverence and worship. On the significance of this passage in relation to the development of the bodhisattva ideal cf. Nattier 2003: 148–151.

"Aggivessana, in this teaching my disciples attain the destruction of the influxes, attain liberation of the mind, attain liberation by wisdom, here and now personally knowing and realizing: 'Birth for me has been eradicated, the holy life has been established, what had to be done has been done, I myself know that there will be no experiencing of any further existence.'"

27. Saccaka, the son of the Nigaṇṭhas, said to the Buddha: "Gotama, it is just as if one might escape from a strong man recklessly wielding a sharp sword, [but] from the debating skills of Gotama it is difficult to escape. As if one might avoid a poisonous snake, or avoid a vast swamp or a fierce fire,[n.46] [45] The images of getting away from being burnt by a fire or bitten by a poisonous snake recur in a Mūlasūtra of the Jain canon, the Dasaveyāliya 9.7, Leumann 1932: 57,9: siyā hu se pāvaya no ḍahejjā, āsīviso vā kuviao na bhakkhe, translated by Schubring in Leumann 1932: 110: "perhaps the fire does not burn [him], the angry snake will not strike [at him]." Bronkhorst 1993/2000: 16f notes that in MN 36 Saccaka also represents Jain positions. or one might escape from a fierce drunken elephant, or from a mad and hungry lion; from all these one might escape, [but] from the debating skills of Gotama it is difficult to find an escape.[n.47] [46] MN 35 at MN I 236,3 has three similes, which describe reaching safety after attacking an elephant, a fire, or a snake. EĀ 37.10 at T II 716c7 only describes a fierce lion, who is not afraid on seeing a man coming. It is not for me, a commoner, impetuous and a lowly man, not endowed with debating skill, to come and call on Gotama for the sake of debating a matter.

"Recluse Gotama, this country of Vesālī is pleasant and prosperous. There are the Cāpāla shrine,[n.48] [47] My attempt to reconstruct the names of the shrines is merely conjectural. SĀ 110 at T II 37a16 reads: 遮波梨支提, 漆菴羅樹支提, 多子支提, 瞿曇在 拘樓陀支提, 娑羅受持支提 (adopting the variant 娑 instead of 婆), 捨重擔 支提, 力士寶冠支提. DN 16 at DN II 102,15 lists the following shrines in the area of Vesālī: Udena, Gotamaka, Sattambaka, Bahuputta, Sārandada, Cāpāla. Its Sanskrit counterpart fragment 173R2–3 and 6, Waldschmidt 1950: 19, lists the following: Cāpāla, Saptāmraka, Bahuputraka, [G](autama-nya)grodha, Sālavrata, Dhurānikṣepaṇa, Makuṭabandhana. the Sattambaka shrine, the Bahuputta shrine, the Gotama-nigrodha shrine, the Sāradhāra shrine, Dhurānikkhepana shrine, and the Balaratana shrine.

"May the Blessed One feel at ease in this country of Vesālī, may the Blessed One always receive worship, respect, and offerings from devas, Māras, Brahmās, recluses, brahmins, and anyone else in the world, so that these devas, Māras, Brahmās, recluses, and brahmins for a long time may be in peace. May he stay here, and with the great congregation [of monks] may he accept my humble food offering tomorrow morning."[n.49] [48] The listing of shrines and Saccaka's wish for the Buddha to be at ease and respected are not reported in the parallel versions. Whereas MN 35 at MN I 236,12 directly proceeds to the invitation for a meal, according to EĀ 37.10 at T II 716c12 Saccaka at this point took refuge. Some degree of conversion appears to be also implicit in SĀ 110, since in the present passage Saccaka no longer addresses the Buddha as "recluse Gotama", 沙門瞿曇, a mode of address used in the early discourses by outsiders and expressive of a certain indifference; cf. Wagle 1966: 56. Instead, in the present passage in SĀ 110 at T II 37a18 Saccaka employs the honorific address 世尊, corresponding to bhagavant and indicative of the respectful attitude a disciple has towards the Buddha.

At that time, the Blessed One accepted by [remaining] silent.

28. Then Saccaka, the son of the Nigaṇṭhas, knowing that the Buddha, the Blessed One, had accepted the invitation by [remaining] silent, rejoiced and was delighted and thrilled. He rose from his seat and left.

At that time, while Saccaka, the son of the Nigaṇṭhas, was on his way [back], he said to the Licchavis: "I have invited the recluse Gotama and a great congregation [of monks]. [Let us] supply the meal together. Each of you prepare one dish of food and send it to my place."[n.50] [49] MN 35 at MN I 236,16 and EĀ 37.10 at T II 716c18 proceed similarly, although without Saccaka giving specific indications as to how much each Licchavi should prepare.

29. The Licchavis each returned to their homes, made preparations during the night and in the morning sent [the food] to the place of Saccaka, the son of the Nigaṇṭhas. In the morning Saccaka, the son of the Nigaṇṭhas, swept [his place], sprinkled water [on the floor], set out seats, and prepared clean water [for washing]. He sent a messenger to the Buddha to announce that the time [for the meal] had arrived.

30. At that time the Blessed One, together with a great company [of monks], put on his robes, took his bowl, and approached the place of Saccaka, the son of the Nigaṇṭhas. He sat in front of the great company. Saccaka, the son of the Nigaṇṭhas, with his own hand respectfully served pure beverages and food, sufficient for the great company. [When] they had eaten and completed washing their bowls, Saccaka, the son of the Nigaṇṭhas, knowing that the Buddha had finished eating and had completed washing his bowl, took a low seat and sat before the Buddha.

At that time, the Blessed One spoke the following stanzas as a thanksgiving to Saccaka, the son of the Nigaṇṭhas:[n.51] [50] Instead of listening to a set of stanzas by the Buddha, in MN 35 at MN I 236,33 Saccaka wishes to share the merit of his offering with the Licchavis and is then told by the Buddha that the Licchavis will receive the merit to be gained by giving to one not free from defilements, like Saccaka, whereas Saccaka himself will receive the merit to be gained by giving to one free from defilements, like the Buddha, after which MN 35 ends. In EĀ 37.10 at T II 716c29 the Buddha gives a gradual teaching at the end of which Saccaka attains streamentry, at which point the Buddha delivers a set of stanzas similar to those found in SĀ 110. EĀ 37.10 then continues by reporting that later on Saccaka's disciples, having found out that their teacher has been converted by the Buddha, intercept him when he is returning from a visit to the Buddha and kill him. On being asked about Saccaka's destiny, the Buddha explains that he has been reborn in the Heaven of the Thirty-three and will reach total liberation at the time of Maitreya Buddha.

"The [performance of the] fire sacrifice
Is foremost among all great gatherings.
The Sāvitthī is foremost
Among treatises and higher scriptures.[n.52] [51] Adopting the variant 闡 instead of 闈. On this set of stanzas cf. Skilling 2003.
The king is foremost among men,
The ocean is foremost of all rivers.
The moon is foremost of all stars,
The sun is foremost in brilliance.
Among devas and men in the ten directions
A fully and rightly awakened one is foremost."
At that time, the Blessed One taught the Dharma in various ways to Saccaka, the son of the Nigaṇṭhas. Having instructed, taught, illuminated, and delighted him, he returned to his former dwelling place.

Then the monks, being together as a group on the road [back], were discussing this matter: "The five hundred Licchavis each prepared food and drinks for Saccaka, the son of the Nigaṇṭhas. What merit have the Licchavis gained, what merit has Saccaka, the son of the Nigaṇṭhas, gained?"

At that time, [when] the monks had returned to their own residence, put away their robes and bowls, and washed their feet, they approached the Blessed One, paid respect with their heads at his feet, withdrew to sit to one side, and said to the Buddha:

"Blessed One, on our way back we discussed the following matter together: 'The five hundred Licchavis prepared the food and drinks for Saccaka, the son of the Nigaṇṭhas, which he offered to the Blessed One and the great company [of monks]. What merit have the Licchavis gained, what merit has Saccaka, the son of the Nigaṇṭhas, gained?'"

The Buddha told the monks: "The Licchavis prepared beverages and drinks for Saccaka, the son of the Nigaṇṭhas, so they obtained merit in dependence on Saccaka, the son of the Nigaṇṭhas. Saccaka, the son of the Nigaṇṭhas, obtained merit [in dependence] on the virtues of the Buddha. The Licchavis obtained the fruits in dependence on giving to one who has desire, anger, and delusion. Saccaka, the son of the Nigaṇṭhas, obtained the fruits in dependence on giving to one who is free from desire, anger, and delusion."

---

Study

Out of the various differences that a comparative study of the "Discourse to Saccaka" in the light of its Majjhima-nikāya and Ekottarika-āgama parallels can yield, in what follows I will focus only on the final episode of the discourse, where the defeated Saccaka offers a meal to the Buddha and his monks. In my study of this last section of the discourse, I will take up in particular the Majjhima-nikāya and the Saṃyukta-āgama versions, as the final section of the Ekottarika-āgama version differs to such an extent from the other two versions as to leave little ground for comparison.

Although this is difficult to ascertain, perhaps the Ekottarika-āgama version incorporated material from an originally different context, in line with a recurrent feature in the Ekottarika-āgama collection of combining different textual pieces in a discourse.[n.53] [52] In Anālayo 2008b: 9f I mentioned three such cases, out of which a particularly evident example is EĀ 49.7, whose first part parallels the tale of the monk Bhaddāli in MN 65 and MĀ 194, but then continues with the tale of Udāyin found in MN 66 and MĀ 192, after which it again returns to the monk Bhaddali. That this is indeed a case of conflation of two originally separate events becomes evident in EĀ 49.7 at T II 801c5, where a sentence begins with an exhortation to Bhaddali, but concludes by telling Udāyin to train himself in this way; cf. in more detail Anālayo 2015b and 2015c. For another case study of this pattern in the Ekottarika-āgama cf. Lamotte 1967.

Be that as it may, a significant difference between the Saṃyukta-āgama and the Majjhima-nikāya versions occurs in relation to the question of the merit accrued from the food offering to the Buddha.[n.54] [53] I already drew attention to this difference in Anālayo 2005: 10. In both versions, the Buddha explains that the Licchavis will only receive the merit of giving to Saccaka, who is not free from defilements, whereas Saccaka will receive the superior merit of giving to the Buddha, who is free from defilements.

Whereas in the Saṃyukta-āgama account the Buddha gives this information to the monks after they have returned to their dwelling, in the Majjhima-nikāya version the Buddha makes this statement in front of Saccaka, who has just dedicated the merit of the meal to those who had supplied the food.[n.55] [54] MN 35 at MN I 236,33: yam idaṃ … dāne puññañ ca puññamahī ca (Ce without ca) taṃ dāyakānaṃ sukhāya (Se: sukhāyeva) hotu, "what merit and ground for merit there is in this offering, may it be for the happiness of the givers." For Saccaka to be publicly told in front of his supporters that his defiled condition makes him an inferior recipient of offerings would be insulting and humiliating. That the Buddha should be portrayed as acting like this is remarkable.

According to all versions, Saccaka had publicly admitted his foolishness of trying to challenge the Buddha. In what appears to be a gesture of reconciliation, he had invited the Buddha and his following for a meal. Thus his role vis-à-vis the Buddha was no longer that of a debater challenging the Buddha, but of a donor of food to the Buddhist monastic community. In view of this different setting, etiquette would demand a conciliatory attitude on the part of the recipients of such an offering. This would all the more be the case when the donor is just making a pious aspiration to share the merit of this offering.

The Saṃyukta-āgama report avoids presenting the Buddha in the almost resentful attitude he displays in the Majjhima-nikāya account. Once the Buddha gives this explanation to his disciples in private, no direct insult or humiliation of Saccaka is involved.

The present instance is to some degree similar to a difference between the three versions of the Cūḷasīhanāda-sutta.[n.56] [55] EĀ 27.2 at T II 644b17 compared to MN 11 at MN I 64,1 and MĀ 103 at T I 590b10; cf. in more detail Anālayo 2009e. Just as in the present instance, the Cūḷasīhanāda-sutta and its parallels depict a debate situation. Of the three versions, the Ekottarika-āgama discourse breathes a considerably less competitive spirit, as here the Buddha does not teach his disciples to proclaim a lion's roar that involves belittling others. Such a version of the lion's roar appears to be more in harmony with the implications and functions of the lion's roar in the early discourses in general and with the teachings given in other discourses on avoiding competitiveness and disparaging remarks. These stand in contrast to the somewhat strident tone adopted in the Cūḷasīhanāda-sutta and its Madhyama-āgama parallel, which might reflect the situation of the Buddhist community after the decease of their teacher, when the struggle for survival among rival religious groups in ancient India may have been felt to require more forceful and competitive ways of expression.

The same tendency could also stand behind the present instance in the Cūḷasaccaka-sutta, whose portrayal of the Buddha is not easy to reconcile with the recurrent emphasis in other canonical passages on forgiveness and patience. According to the Abhayarājakumāra-sutta, for example, the Buddha would speak what is hurtful to others only if this is beneficial.[n.57] [56] MN 58 at MN I 395,13. Applied to the Cūḷasaccaka-sutta, it is not easy to understand how the Buddha's remark benefitted Saccaka.[n.58] [57] Ps II 283,27 explains the benefit of the Buddha's remark to be that it will leave an impression on Saccaka's mind for the future, a vāsanā. That the commentary comes up with such an explanation shows that the difficulties inherent in this episode did not go unnoticed. In contrast, for the Buddha to be addressing a defeated opponent, who has just made the reconciliatory gesture of offering food, by delivering the set of stanzas recorded in the two Chinese versions would be more easily understandable.

Transference of Merit

Another noteworthy aspect of the present episode is related to the merit accrued by this food offering. The Saṃyukta-āgama version agrees with the Majjhima-nikaya account that the Licchavis will not receive the merit of preparing a meal for the Buddha. This is remarkable, since the Licchavis knew that the food they were giving to Saccaka was going to be offered to the Buddha and his monks. Yet the circumstance that they prepared the food at the instigation of Saccaka and then gave it to him prevents them from receiving the merit obtainable through making an offering to the Buddha.

The position taken in the Saṃyukta-āgama and the Majjhima-nikāya versions in this way reflects the early Buddhist conception of the relationship between karma and its fruit, which emphasizes individual responsibility and sees intention as the key factor. In the present case, the intention of the Licchavis was to give to Saccaka, hence they receive the merit that corresponds to this intention. Their offering was done at the instigation of Saccaka, whose intention was to make an offering to the Buddha. Hence his gain of merit will be accordingly, even though his giving was based on assistance received from others.

The Majjhima-nikāya discourse stands alone in reporting that Saccaka even tried to dedicate the merit of the food offering to the Licchavis. Since the Buddha in his reply indicates that the Licchavis will not be able to receive the merit Saccaka wishes to dedicate to them, the present episode in the Cūḷasaccaka-sutta constitutes a clear denial of the transfer of merit.[n.59] [58] This has already been pointed out by Witanachchi 1987: 155 and Egge 2002: 58.

This explicit denial, found only in the Pāli version, is remarkable. Other passages among the early discourses are in fact less unequivocal in regard to the theme of merit transfer, an expression that stands for a "deliberate and voluntary passing on to another person of (religious) merit gained by a person for himself".[n.60] [59] This definition has been provided by Wezler 1997: 578.

An instance that shows some similarities to the event depicted in the Cūḷasaccaka-sutta occurs in the Aṅguttara-nikāya. The discourse in question reports that one of the Four Heavenly Kings by the name of Vessavaṇa, who is on route to attend to some matter at hand, overhears the lay disciple Nandamātā reciting a set of stanzas. When she has finished, he praises her recitation.

Once she comes to know about the identity of her august visitor, Nandamātā dedicates the stanzas as her 'gift' to him.[n.61] [60] AN 7.50 at AN IV 63,23: ayaṃ dhammapariyāyo bhaṇito, idan (Be and Se: idaṃ) te hotu ātitheyyaṃ. Vessavaṇa reciprocates by informing her that Sāriputta and Mahāmoggallāna are about to arrive without having had a meal, asking her to prepare food for them and, when giving it to them, declare that the offering was done on his behalf.[n.62] [61] AN 7.50 at AN IV 64,3: mamaṃ (Be, Ce, and Se: mama) dakkhiṇaṃ ādiseyyāsi, etañ ca (Be: etañ ce va; Ce and Se: evañ ca) me bhavissati ātitheyyaṃ. The original point of his instruction could simply be that she is to "point out", ādisati, to the monks who is responsible for the fact that the meal is already prepared for them. On the term cf. Cone 2001: 299, who s.v. ādisati lists the following range of meanings: "aims at; points out, indicates; relates, declares, foretells; dedicates; assigns (one's own puñña to someone else)"; cf. also Gehman 1923: 411. By in this way informing her of this opportunity and motivating her to prepare food in time, Vessavaṇa has responded to her 'gift' of stanzas by making a 'gift' to her in turn.

Since Vessavaṇa is the one responsible for the offering and since it is his intention to benefit the travelling monks, he naturally will derive merit from the deed.[n.63] [62] McDermott 1984/2003: 41 comments that "it is to be noted that the proposed gift of hospitality is not merely to be declared the gift of the deva. It is also his gift in that the idea for it originated with him. He planned the gift, and good intention bears good fruit." When Nandamātā carries out his instruction to inform the monks of the one who has instructed her to make this timely offering, she employs a formulation that reads as if she is making a transfer of merit.[n.64] [63] After reporting to Sāriputta what has happened, in AN 7.50 at AN IV 65,10 she employs the formula "venerable sir, may the merit and benefit of this offering be for the happiness of the Great King Vessavaṇa", yad idaṃ, bhante, dāne puññaṃ hitaṃ (Be: puññañca puññamahī ca taṃ, Se: puññaṃ puññamahitaṃ) vessavaṇassa mahārājassa sukhāya hotu. Egge 2002: 57 comments that "we have good reason to believe, however, that this dedicatory formula has been interpolated into the text", since "Sāriputta does not acknowledge this dedication with an anumodana … as one would expect, but continues to speak with Nandamātā about her meeting with Vessavaṇa" as if nothing had happened. Even though this may not constitute an actual case of merit transfer – given that Vessavaṇa had taken such an active role as to become a recipient of merit anyway – it is easy to see how from such instances the practice of transferring merit could have evolved.

The theme of transfer of merit comes up also in a passage in the Mahāparinibbāna-sutta. According to the Pāli and Sanskrit versions of this passage, at the end of a food offering received from a brahmin, the Buddha speaks a set of stanzas in which he recommends dedicating (ādisati) the gift to the local devas.[n.65] [64] DN 16 at DN II 88,30 (= Ud 89,22 and Vin I 229,37): dakkhiṇam ādise; fragment 163R3, Waldschmidt 1950: 13: dakṣiṇām-ādiśet, where this stanza is spoken in reply to a corresponding dedication made by the brahmin. Harvey 2000/2005: 66 explains that according to the Theravāda commentaries, if a food offering to monks is "dedicated to an ancestor or god, so that the donation was done on his or her behalf … provided they assent to this donation by rejoicing at it (Vv. A. 188), they will themselves generate karmic fruitfulness, both from the donation-by-proxy and from the mental act of rejoicing."

Such a recommendation by the Buddha does not occur in three Chinese parallel discourses.[n.66] [65] DĀ 2 at T I 12c14, T 5 at T I 162c27, and T 6 at T I 178a10 (in the last case there is a dedication, but this is initiated by the brahmin himself). The counterpart to Ud 8.6 at Ud 89,22 is rather short and does not report the meal offering at all; cf. T 212 at T IV 707c4. In view of the composite nature of the Mahāparinibbāna-sutta, noted by a range of scholars,[n.67] [66] Cf., e.g., Rhys Davids 1910: 71–73, Przyluski 1918, 1919, and 1920, Winternitz 1920/1968: 29–32, Waldschmidt 1939/1967 (also 1948: 335–354), Pachow 1945 and 1946, Dutt 1957: 47, Pande 1957: 98–106. Williams 1970, Snellgrove 1973, Bareau 1979, Norman 1983: 37–38, and An 2001. it is possible that the Chinese versions reflect the original condition of this episode, with the stanzas in the Pāli and Sanskrit versions only being a later addition. Nevertheless, their occurrence does point to the acceptance of the practice of dedicating gifts to the gods in the respective reciter traditions.

Another discourse sometimes quoted in relation to merit transfer occurs in the Aṅguttara-nikāya and the Saṃyukta-āgama. The two versions report how a brahmin approaches the Buddha and enquires whether the departed will partake of offerings (dāna).[n.68] [67] AN 10.177 at AN V 269,8 and SĀ 1041 at T II 272b11. The Buddha replies that this is the case if one's relatives have been reborn as ghosts, not if they have been reborn as hell beings, animals, humans or devas, as in these cases they instead subsist on the food available in those realms. Thus the theme of this discourse is not transfer of merit,[n.69] [68] Gombrich 1971: 210 comments that "in this text, no reference is made to the merit of the act; the gift is said to benefit (upakappati) the relatives and they to enjoy (paribhuñjati) it, so presumably the object passes to them direct. That all this is addressed to a brahmin points up the fact that the Buddhists were consciously adapting Hindu custom." but the ancient Indian practice of offering gifts to one's departed ancestors, also reflected in other passages.[n.70] [69] For example AN 5.39 at AN III 43,18 indicates that the duty of a son consists in: petānaṃ kālakatānaṃ (Be: kālaṅkatānaṃ) dakkhiṇaṃ anuppadassati, a formulation that recurs in a similar context also in DN 31 at DN III 189,8. Schmithausen 1986: 211 points out that this may simply mean "the son's presenting or passing on gifts of food, etc., to his deceased parents as a recompense for what they have done for him when they were still alive." It is easy to see how from the continuity of this ancient Indian practice of offerings to one's departed ancestors the practice of transferring merit to them would have developed. On transfer of merit in early Buddhist texts and inscriptions cf. also Woodward 1914: 46f and 50, Weeraratne 1965: 748, Malalasekera 1967: 87, Amore 1971: 148–150, McDermott 1974, Ruegg 1974: 210 note 37, Schalk 1976: 88f, Agasse 1978: 313f and 329, Holt 1981: 10–19, Oguibénine 1982: 404, Keyes 1983: 281, Schopen 1985/1997: 34–43, White 1986: 206, Bechert 1992: 105f, Herrman-Pfandt 1996: 82–92, Marasinghe 2005: 469, and Pemaratana 2013: 92f and 99. On the ancient Indian conception of merit cf. esp. Filliozat 1980, Hara 1994, and Wezler 1997; for further publications on transfer of merit in general cf. the bibliographical survey in Wezler 1997: 585–589.

In sum, although the denial of the transfer of merit in the Cūḷasaccaka-sutta conveys a clear-cut position, other discourses give the impression that, even though the transfer of merit may not have been part of the teachings from the outset, it nevertheless must have made its appearance at a relatively early stage in the history of Buddhism. Whatever may be the final word on the transfer of merit in early Buddhism, the agreement between the Cūḷasaccaka-sutta and its Saṃyukta-āgama parallel highlights that central factors for the generation of merit are one's own intention and actions undertaken accordingly.

In this way, a comparison of the Cūḷasaccaka-sutta with its Saṃyukta-āgama counterpart brings to light agreement in central matters together with interesting variations. This aptly reflects the general potential of comparative studies of the early discourses, where often concordance on essentials can be found embedded in a framework of smaller but sometimes noteworthy differences.